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Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department
of Environmental Protection
08-1151
Ruling Below: Fla Dep't of Enyt/. Prot. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. 998 So. 2d 1102
(Fla. 2008).
After damage by hurricanes and tropical storms, beaches in Walton County, Florida, were
identified as critically eroded. The county and Florida DEP sought to restore the beaches through
renourishment. After the permit for renourishment was issued, Stop the Beach Renourishment
(STBR), a not-for-profit association made up of beachfront property owners, challenged the
permit's issuance and raised questions about the constitutional validity of the act of authorizing
renourishment permits. The First District Court of Appeal ruled that the act was
unconstitutionally applied in the issuance of this permit. The Supreme Court of Florida then
changed the certified question on appeal to whether the statute was facially constitutional and did
away with the as-applied language that STBR had used in its pleadings and that the First District
had used in considering the question below. The Florida Supreme Court found the statute facially
valid and quashed the First District Court's opinion.
Question Presented: Does Florida's Beach and Shore Restoration Act deprive upland owners of
littoral property rights without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Taking
Clause?
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, etc., Petitioner,
V.
STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, Inc., et al., Respondents.
Supreme Court of Florida
Decided September 29, 2008
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
BELL, J.
We have for review the First District Court
of Appeal's decision in Save Our Beaches,
Inc. '. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection. In its decision,
the First District certified the following
question to be of great public importance:
Has Part I of Chapter 161, Florida
Statutes (2005), referred to as the
Beach and Shore Preservation Act,
been unconstitutionally applied so as
to deprive the members of Stop the
Beach Renourishment, Inc. of their
riparian rights without just
compensation for the property taken,
so that the exception provided in
Florida Administrative Code Rule
18-21.004(3), exempting satisfactory
evidence of sufficient upland interest
if the activities do not unreasonably
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infringe on riparian rights, does not
apply?
We have both mandatory and discretionary
jurisdiction.
Though it phrased its certified question in
terms of an applied challenge, the First
District actually addressed a facial
challenge. Therefore, we rephrase the
certified question as follows:
On its face, does the Beach and
Shore Preservation Act
unconstitutionally deprive upland
owners of littoral rights without just
compensation?
We answer the rephrased certified question
in the negative and quash the decision of the
First District. As explained below, we find
that, on its face, the Beach and Shore
Preservation Act does not unconstitutionally
deprive upland owners of littoral rights
without just compensation. At the outset,
however, we emphasize that our decision in
this case is strictly limited to the context of
restoring critically eroded beaches under the
Beach and Shore Preservation Act.
I. THE CONTEXT
A. Factual and Procedural History
[After Hurricane Opal destroyed Destin and
Walton County beaches along the Gulf of
Mexico, the municipalities began the
process of restoration.
A coastline survey was completed to
determine the mean high water line
(MHWL), from which an erosion control
line (ECL) was established. The ECL
became the boundary between public and
private property when it was recorded. The
Department of Environmental Protection
(Department) then issued the
permit to allow the restoration.
required
Stop the Beach Renourishment (STBR)
challenged the permit, arguing that the
statute fixing the ECL was an
unconstitutional taking of private property.]
The First District agreed the Act divests
upland owners of their littoral right to
receive accretions and relictions because
section 161.191(2) provides that the
common law rule of accretion and reliction
no longer operates once the ECL is
recorded. The First District also agreed that
the Act eliminates the right to maintain
direct contact with the water since section
161.191(1) establishes the ECL as the
shoreline boundary. Furthermore, the First
District found that:
Although section 161.201 has
language describing a preservation of
common law riparian rights, it does
not actually operate to preserve the
rights at issue . . . [because] Florida's
law is clear that riparian rights
cannot be severed from riparian
uplands absent an agreement with
the riparian owner, not even by the
power of eminent domain.
Thus, the First District held that the final
order issued pursuant to the Act results in an
unconstitutional taking of the littoral rights
to accretion and to contact with water
without an eminent domain proceeding as
required by section 161.141, Florida
Statutes.
B. The Beach and Shore Preservation Act
Before addressing the rephrased certified
question, it is helpful to provide the relevant
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portions of the Beach and Shore
Preservation Act.
Recognizing the importance and volatility of
Florida's beaches, the Legislature in 1961
enacted the Beach and Shore Preservation
Act. . . The Legislature then delegated to
the Department the authority to determine
"those beaches which are critically eroded
and in need of restoration and nourishment"
and to "authorize appropriations to pay up to
75 percent of the actual costs for restoring
and renourishing a critically eroded beach."
Pursuant to section 161.141, when a local
government applies for funding for beach
restoration, a survey of the shoreline is
conducted to determine the MHWL for the
area. Once established, any additions to the
upland property landward of the MHWL
that result from the restoration project
remain the property of the upland owner
subject to all governmental regulations,
including a public easement for traditional
uses of the beach.
After the MHWL is established, section
161.161(3) provides that the Board must
determine the area to be protected by the
project and locate an ECL. In locating the
ECL, the Board is "guided by the existing
line of mean high water, bearing in mind the
requirements of proper engineering in the
beach restoration project, the extent to
which erosion or avulsion has occurred, and
the need to protect existing ownership of as
much upland as is reasonably possible."
Pursuant to section 161.191(1), this ECL
becomes the new fixed property boundary
between public lands and upland property
after the ECL is recorded. And, under
section 161.191(2), once the ECL has been
established, the common law no longer
operates "to increase or decrease the
proportions of any upland property lying
landward of such line, either by accretion or
erosion or by any other natural or artificial
process."
However, section 161.201 expressly
preserves the upland owners' littoral rights,
including, but not limited to, rights of
ingress, egress, view, boating, bathing, and
fishing, and prevents the State from erecting
structures on the beach seaward of the ECL
except as required to prevent erosion.
Section 161.141 further declares that the
State has no intention "to extend its claims
to lands not already held by it or to deprive
any upland or submerged land owner of the
legitimate and constitutional use and
enjoyment of his or her property."
Moreover, section 161.141 explains that
"[i]f an authorized beach restoration, beach
nourishment, and erosion control project
cannot reasonably be accomplished without
the taking of private property, the taking
must be made by the requesting authority by
eminent domain proceedings." And, in the
event the beach restoration is not
commenced within a two-year period, is
halted in excess of a six-month period, or
the authorities do not maintain the restored
beach, section 161.211 dictates that the ECL
is cancelled.
II. DISCUSSION
. . . The determination of a statute's
constitutionality and the interpretation of a
constitutional provision are both questions
of law reviewed de novo by this Court. ...
Moreover, "a determination that a statute is
facially unconstitutional means that no set of
circumstances exists under which the statute
would be valid." Fla. Dep 't of Revenue v.
City of Gainesville.
After reviewing Florida's common law as
well as the Beach and Shore Preservation
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Act's effect upon that common law, we find
that the Act, on its face, does not
unconstitutionally deprive upland owners of
littoral rights without just compensation. In
explaining our conclusion, we first describe
the relationship at common law between the
public and upland owners in regard to
Florida's beaches. We then detail the Beach
and Shore Preservation Act's impact upon
this relationship. In particular, we explore
how the Act effectuates the State's
constitutional duty to protect Florida's
beaches in a way that facially balances
public and private interests. Finally, we
address the First District's decision.
A. The Relationship at Common Law
between the Public and Upland Owners
Since the vast development of Florida's
beaches, there has been a relative paucity of
opinions from this Court that describe the
nature of the relationship at common law
between the public and upland owners in
regard to Florida's beaches. It is important
that we outline this relationship prior to
resolving the specific issues in this case.
(1) The Public and Florida's Beaches
[The State has a duty to protect the beaches
under the "public trust doctrine" and as
important natural resources, as defined by
the Florida constitution.]
Concisely put, the State has a constitutional
duty to protect Florida's beaches, part of
which it holds "in trust for all the people."
Art. ), § 11, Fla. Const.
(2) The Upland Owners and Florida's
Beaches
Private upland owners hold the bathing,
fishing, and navigation rights described
above in common with the public. In fact,
upland owners have no rights . . . that are
superior to other members of the public in
regard to bathing, fishing, and navigation.
However, upland owners hold several
special or exclusive common law littoral
rights: (1) the right to have access to the
water; (2) the right to reasonably use the
water; (3) the right to accretion and
reliction; and (4) the right to the
unobstructed view of the water. These
special littoral rights "are such as are
necessary for the use and enjoyment" of the
upland property, but "these rights may not
be so exercised as to injure others in their
lawful rights." Ferry Pass, 48 So. at 645.
Though subject to regulation, these littoral
rights are private property rights that cannot
be taken from upland owners without just
compensation. Indeed, in Thiesen v. Gulf
Florida & Alabama Railway Co., this Court
considered and rejected the notion that
littoral rights are subordinate to public rights
and, as a result, could be eliminated without
compensation. And, over the years, Florida
courts have found unconstitutional takings
when certain littoral rights were materially
and substantially impaired.
While Florida case law has clearly defined
littoral rights as constitutionally protected
private property rights, the exact nature of
these rights rarely has been described in
detail. ...
. . . [T]he littoral rights to access, use, and
view are easements under Florida common
law. Generally speaking, "[a]n easement
creates a nonpossessory right to enter and
use land in the possession of another and
obligates the possessor not to interfere with
the uses authorized by the easement." More
specifically, the littoral rights to access and
use are affirmative easements as they grant
"rights to enter and use land in possession of
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another." In contrast, the littoral right to
vie\V is a negative easement as it "restrict[s]
the uses that can be made of property."
Furthermore, based upon this Court's early
description of the nature of littoral rights, it
is evident that the littoral right to accretion
and reliction is distinct from the rights to
access, use, and view. The rights to access,
use, and view are rights relating to the
present use of the foreshore and water. The
same is not true of the right to accretion and
reliction. The right to accretion and reliction
is a contingent, future interest that only
becomes a possessory interest if and when
land is added to the upland by accretion or
reliction.
(3) Dealing with a Dynamic Boundary
The boundary between public or sovereignty
lands and private uplands is a dynamic
boundary, which is located on a shoreline
that, by its very nature, frequently changes.
Florida's common law attempts to bring
order and certainty to this dynamic boundary
in a manner that reasonably balances the
affected parties' interests.
[The court reviews common law definitions.
Erosion is gradual and imperceptible
wearing away of land. Accretion is gradual
and imperceptible accumulation of land on
the shore. Reliction is an increase of land by
gradual and imperceptible withdrawal of a
body of water. Avulsion is the sudden,
perceptible loss of or addition to land by a
sudden change. Gradual and imperceptible
means that changes are not observed
occurring, but observers may periodically
observe changes.] Moreover, "alluvion"
describes the actual deposit of land that is
added to the shore or bank.
The boundary between public lands and
private uplands is the MHWL, which
represents an average over a nineteen-year
period. As the Second District has
explained, -[t]he variations which occur in
major tide producing forces will go through
one complete cycle in approximately 18.6
years. Apparently this figure is often
rounded out to nineteen years." Kruse, 349
So. 2d at 789-90. This nineteen-year period
for determining the MHWL is codified in
section 177.27, Florida Statutes (2007), a
provision of the Florida Coastal Mapping
Act of 1974.
Under Florida common law, the legal effect
of changes to the shoreline on the boundary
between public lands and uplands varies
depending upon whether the shoreline
changes gradually and imperceptibly or
whether it changes suddenly and
perceptibly.
Accordingly, under the doctrines of erosion,
reliction, and accretion, the boundary
between public and private land is altered to
reflect gradual and imperceptible losses or
additions to the shoreline. In contrast, under
the doctrine of avulsion, the boundary
between public and private land remains the
MHWL as it existed before the avulsive
event led to sudden and perceptible losses or
additions to the shoreline.
These common law doctrines reflect an
attempt to balance the interests of the parties
affected by inevitable changes in the
shoreline. For instance, as the Second
District explained in Board of Trustees of
the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v.
Medeira Beach Nominee, Inc., "[t]here are
four reasons for the doctrine of accretion:"
(1) [Dje minimis non curat lex; (2)
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he who sustains the burden of losses
and of repairs imposed by the
contiguity of waters ought to receive
whatever benefits they may bring by
accretion; (3) it is in the interest of
the community that all land have an
owner and, for convenience, the
riparian is the chosen one; (4) the
necessity for preserving the riparian
right of access to the water.
These same reasons explain the doctrine of
reliction. And, as for the rationale
underlying the doctrine of avulsion, it has
been argued that there is a need to mitigate
the hardship of drastic shifts in title that
would result if the doctrines of accretion,
erosion, and reliction were applied to sudden
and unexpected changes in the shoreline.
While our common law has developed these
specific rules that are intended to balance
the interests in our ever-changing shoreline,
Florida's common law has never fully
addressed how public-sponsored beach
restoration affects the interests of the public
and the interests of the upland owners. ...
B. The Beach and Shore Preservation
Act's Balancing of Public and Private
Interests
As explained earlier, the State has a
constitutional duty to protect Florida's
beaches, part of which it holds in trust for
public use. The Beach and Shore
Preservation Act effectuates this
constitutional duty when the State is faced
with critically eroded, storm-damaged
beaches.
Like the common law, the Act seeks a
careful balance between the interests of the
public and the interests of the private upland
owners. By authorizing the addition of sand
to sovereignty lands, the Act prevents
further loss of public beaches, protects
existing structures, and repairs prior
damage. In doing so, the Act promotes the
public's economic, ecological, recreational,
and aesthetic interests in the shoreline. On
the other hand, the Act benefits private
upland owners by restoring beach already
lost and by protecting their property from
future storm damage and erosion. Moreover,
the Act expressly preserves the upland
owners' rights to access, use, and view,
including the rights of ingress and egress.
The Act also protects the upland owners'
rights to boating, bathing, and fishing.
Furthermore, the Act protects the upland
owners' view by prohibiting the State from
erecting structures on the new beach except
those necessary to prevent erosion. Thus,
although the Act provides that the State may
retain title to the newly created dry land
directly adjacent to the water, upland owners
may continue to access, use, and view the
beach and water as they did prior to beach
restoration. As a result, at least facially,
there is no material or substantial
impairment of these littoral rights under the
Act.
Finally, the Act provides for the cancellation
of the ECL if (1) the beach restoration is not
commenced within two years; (2) restoration
is halted in excess of a six-month period; or
(3) the authorities do not maintain the
restored beach. Therefore, in the event the
beach restoration is not completed and
maintained, the rights of the respective
parties revert to the status quo ante.
To summarize, the Act effectuates the
State's constitutional duty to protect
Florida's beaches in a way that reasonably
balances public and private interests.
Without the beach renourishment provided
for under the Act, the public would lose vital
economic and natural resources. As for the
upland owners, the beach renourishment
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protects their property from future storm
damage and erosion while preserving their
littoral rights to access, use, and view.
Consequently, just as with the common law,
the Act facially achieves a reasonable
balance of interests and rights to uniquely
valuable and volatile property interests.
C. The First District's Decision
As stated earlier, the First District
determined that the Beach and Shore
Preservation Act results in an
unconstitutional taking of upland owners'
rights to accretions and to contact with the
water. In its opinion, the First District
essentially employed the following three-
step analysis: (1) it found sections 161.191
and 161.201, which fix the shoreline
boundary and suspend the operation of the
common law rule of accretion but preserve
the littoral rights of access, view, and use
after an ECL is recorded, facially
unconstitutional; (2) then, because eminent
domain proceedings did not occur as
required by section 161.141, it found that
the Act was unconstitutionally applied by
the Department in this case; and (3) because
littoral rights were unconstitutionally taken,
it found that property rights had been
unreasonably infringed, making it necessary
for the Department to provide satisfactory
evidence of sufficient upland interest
pursuant to rule 18-21.004(3).
We find facially constitutional the
provisions of the Act that fix the shoreline
boundary and that suspend the operation of
the common law rule of accretion but
preserve the littoral rights of access, view,
and use after an ECL is recorded. Therefore,
we hold that the Act, on its face, does not
unconstitutionally deprive upland owners of
littoral rights without just compensation.
(1) Doctrine ofAvulsion
In its opinion, the First District stated that
beach restoration under the Act "will cause
the high water mark to move seaward and
ordinarily this would result in the upland
landowners gaining property by accretion."
This statement fails to consider the doctrine
of avulsion, most likely because the parties
did not raise the issue before the First
District. As a result, the First District never
considered whether the Act is facially
constitutional given the doctrine of avulsion.
Under Florida common law,
such as Hurricane Opal in
generally considered avulsive
cause avulsion....
hurricanes,
1995, are
events that
Contrary to the First District's statement
about accretion, under the doctrine of
avulsion, the boundary between public lands
and privately owned uplands remains the
MHWL as it existed before the avulsive
event. In Peppe, this Court expressly applied
the doctrine of avulsion and held that title to
a narrow strip of land that was submerged
until a 1926 hurricane brought it to the
surface remained in the State, not the
adjoining landowners. This Court first
determined that the hurricane was an
avulsive event. Then, we reasoned that the
parcel in question "was originally
sovereignty land; and it did not lose that
character merely because, by avulsion, it
became dry land." Therefore, we found that
"the plaintiff-respondents were charged with
notice that the sudden avulsion of the parcel
in controversy gave them no more title to it
than they had to the water bottom before its
emergence as dry land."
Significantly, when an avulsive event leads
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to the loss of land, the doctrine of avulsion
recognizes the affected property owner's
right to reclaim the lost land within a
reasonable time. In State v. Florida National
Properties, Inc., this Court specifically
explained that affected property owners can
return their property to its pre-hurricane
status. [L]ittoral "owners had exercised self-
help by dynamiting obstacles from a
drainage canal to return [Lake Istokpoga] to
an ordinary level . . . following the historic
1926 hurricane." This Court stated that the
"self-help by the [littoral] owners did not
affect [sic] a lowering of the water level
below the normal high-water mark; instead,
as the survey notes show, the action merely
returned the water to its normal level and did
not expose any lake bottom." In that
circumstance, the Court determined that the
littoral owners retained title to the present
MHWL, which represented the pre-
hurricane MHWL, and to the land they had
reclaimed through lawful drainage of the
lake.
To summarize, when the shoreline is
impacted by an avulsive event, the boundary
between public lands and private uplands
remains the pre-avulsive event MHWL.
Consequently, if the shoreline is lost due to
an avulsive event, the public has the right to
restore its shoreline up to that MHWL.
In light of this common law doctrine of
avulsion, the provisions of the Beach and
Shore Preservation Act at issue are facially
constitutional. In the context of restoring
storm-ravaged public lands, the State would
not be doing anything under the Act that it
would not be entitled to accomplish under
Florida's common law. Like the common
law doctrine of avulsion, the Act authorizes
the State to reclaim its storm-damaged
shoreline by adding sand to submerged
sovereignty lands. And similar to the
common law, the Act authorizes setting the
ECL and the boundary between sovereignty
lands and private uplands at "the existing
line of mean high water, bearing in mind ...
the extent to which . . . avulsion has
occurred." In other words, when restoring
storm-ravaged shoreline, the boundary under
the Act should remain the pre-avulsive event
boundary. Thus, because the Act authorizes
actions to reclaim public beaches that are
also authorized under the common law after
an avulsive event, the Act is facially
constitutional.
(2) Common Law Right to Accretion
Additionally, we disagree with the First
District's determination that section
161.191(2) results in a facial and
unconstitutional taking of the littoral right of
accretion. We do not find the littoral right to
accretion applicable in the context of this
Act.
As we explained earlier, the right to
accretion under Florida common law is a
contingent right. It is a right that arises from
a rule of convenience intended to balance
public and private interests by automatically
allocating small amounts of gradually
accreted lands to the upland owner without
resort to legal proceedings and without
disturbing the upland owner's rights to
access to and use of the water.
[The court restates the four reasons for the
doctrine of accretion, cited earlier.]
None of these doctrinal reasons apply here.
First, the beach restoration provisions of the
Act do not apply to situations involving de
minimis additions or losses of land. More
specifically, critically eroded shorelines can
hardly be characterized as trifles with which
the law does not concern itself. Similarly,
the beach renourishment itself is a change to
the shoreline that is more than de minimis.
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Second, by authorizing the creation of a
buffer area of beach on sovereignty land, the
Act removes the upland ownerI s
concomitant risk of losses and repairs due to
erosion. After renourishment, the risk of loss
and repair lies more with the State than with
the upland owner. Third, all land has an
owner under the Act because the property
line between private and public land is
clearly and conveniently fixed at the ECL.
Fourth, the upland owner's littoral right of
access is preserved under the Act.
Consequently, the common law rule of
accretion, which is intended to balance
private and public interests, is not implicated
in the context of this Act.
(3) Contact is Ancillary to the Littoral Right
ofAccess
The First District concluded that, under
section 161.191(1), upland owners "lose the
right to have the property's contact with the
water remain intact." However, under
Florida common law, there is no
independent right of contact with the water.
Instead, contact is ancillary to the littoral
right of access to the water.
The ancillary right to contact with the water
exists to preserve the upland owner's core
littoral right of access to the water. We have
never addressed whether littoral rights are
unconstitutionally taken based solely upon
the loss of an upland owner's direct contact
with the water. But we have held that littoral
rights are unconstitutionally taken when
sovereignty lands are used in a way that
deprives the upland owner of the right of
access to the water.
In this case, the Act expressly protects the
right of access to the water, which is the sole
justification for the subsidiary right of
contact. The Act preserves the rights of
ingress and egress and prevents the State
from erecting structures upon the beach
seaward of the ECL except as required to
prevent erosion. The Act also provides that
the State has no intention "to extend its
claims to lands not already held by it or to
deprive any upland or submerged land
owner of the legitimate and constitutional
use and enjoyment of his or her property."
At least facially, these provisions ensure that
the upland owner's access to the water
remains intact. Therefore, the rationale for
the ancillary right to contact is satisfied.
Furthermore, it is important to understand
that contrary to what might be inferred from
the First District's conclusion regarding
contact, there is no littoral right to a seaward
boundary at the water's edge in Florida.
Rather, as explained previously, the
boundary between sovereignty lands and
private uplands is the MHWL, which
represents an average over a nineteen-year
period. Although the foreshore technically
separates upland property from the water's
edge at various times during the nineteen-
year period, it has never been considered to
infringe upon the upland owner's littoral
right of access, which the ancillary right to
contact is meant to preserve. Admittedly, the
renourished beach may be wider than the
typical foreshore, but the ultimate result is
the same. Direct access to the water is
preserved under the Act. In other words,
because the Act safeguards access to the
water and because there is no right to
maintain a constant boundary with the
water's edge, the Act, on its face, does not
unconstitutionally eliminate the ancillary
right to contact.
Lastly, we briefly explain our disagreement
with the First District's use of Belvedere to
discount the Act's express preservation of
littoral rights in section 161.201.
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III. CONCLUSION
In its opinion, the First District concluded
that "Belvedere controls by explicitly
holding that [littoral] rights cannot be
constitutionally reserved to the landowners
as described in section 161.201." Contrary
to the First District, we do not find our
decision in Belvedere controlling or even
particularly relevant.
In Belvedere, the Department of
Transportation sought to acquire uplands in
fee simple absolute, while expressly
reserving the littoral rights to the former
upland owners. The Department severed the
littoral rights in an attempt to limit the
compensation for uplands in eminent
domain proceedings. In Belvedere, we were
particularly concerned that the former
upland owners did not have the actual ability
to exercise any of their reserved littoral
rights since they held no easement or right to
enter upon their former land. Therefore, we
held in Belvedere that littoral rights "cannot
be severed by condemnation proceedings
without the consent of the upland owner." In
so holding, we emphasized that our decision
was limited to the context of condemnation
of upland property.
This case is clearly distinguishable from
Belvedere. STBR is not arguing that the Act
necessitates the condemnation of uplands.
Thus, our holding that was limited to the
context of condemnation of upland property
is inapplicable.
Furthermore, in contrast to the
circumstances of Belvedere, upland owners
under the Act continue to have the ability to
exercise their littoral rights to access, use,
and view. Given these significant
differences, Belvedere does not apply here.
As we havc explained, the Beach and Shore
Preservation Act effectuates the State's
constitutional duty to protect Florida's
beaches. And, like Florida common law, the
Act facially achieves a reasonable balance
between public and private interests in the
shore. Specifically, the Act benefits upland
owners by restoring lost beach, by
protecting their property from future storm
damage and erosion, and by preserving their
littoral rights to use and view. The Act also
benefits upland owners by protecting their
littoral right of access to the water, which is
the sole justification for the ancillary right of
contact. Additionally, the Act authorizes
actions to reclaim public beaches that are
also authorized under the common law after
an avulsive event. Furthermore, the littoral
right to accretion is not implicated by the
Act because the reasons underlying this
common law rule are not present in this
context.
In light of the above, we find that the Act,
on its face, does not unconstitutionally
deprive upland owners of littoral rights
without just compensation. Consequently,
we answer the rephrased certified question
in the negative and QUASH the decision of
the First District. And we again emphasize
that our decision in this case is strictly
limited to the context of restoring critically
eroded beaches under the Beach and Shore
Preservation Act.
It is so ordered.
[The dissenting opinion of Well, J. is
omitted]
LEWIS, J., dissenting.
I cannot join the majority because of the
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(4) Belvedere
manner in which it has "butchered" Florida
law in its attempted search for equitable
answers to several issues arising in the
context of beach restoration in Florida. In
attempting to answer these questions, the
majority has, in my vicw. unnecessarily
created dangerous precedent constructed
upon a manipulation of the question actually
certified. Additionally, I fear that the
majority's construction of the Beach and
Shore Preservation Act is based upon infirm,
tortured logic and a rescission from existing
precedent under a hollow claim that existing
law does not apply or is not relevant here.
Today, the majority has simply erased well-
established Florida law without proper
analysis, and has further disregarded the
manner in which the parties pled, and the
lower court analyzed, an as-applied
constitutional challenge. As the majority
recognizes, the local governmental entities
have yet to properly establish that the
erosion-control line ("ECL") represents the
pre-avulsion or pre-critical-erosion mean
high-water line ("MHWL"), which in my
view, is a critical factor in determining
whether the State and local governmental
entities have constitutionally applied the Act
to the six property-owner members of Stop
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. ("STBR").
First, the logic upon which the entire
foundation of the majority opinion is based
inherently assumes that contact with the
particular body of water has absolutely no
protection and is just some ancillary concept
that tags along with access to the water and
seemingly possesses little or no independent
significance. I could not disagree more. By
essential, inherent definition, riparian and
littoral property is that which is contiguous
to, abuts, borders, adjoins, or touches water.
In this State, the legal essence of littoral or
riparian land is contact with the water. Thus,
the majority is entirely incorrect when it
states that such contact has no protection
under Florida law and is merely some
"ancillary" concept that is subsumed by the
right of access. In other words, the land must
touch the water as a condition precedent to
all other riparian or littoral rights and, in the
case of littoral property, this touching must
occur at the MHWL.
I agree with former
Fourth District Court
this Court to take
Development Corp.
Administration:
Judge Hersey of the
of Appeal, who urged
action in Belvedere
v. Division of
To speak of riparian or littoral rights
unconnected with ownership of the
shore is to speak a non sequitur.
Hopefully, the Supreme Court will
take jurisdiction and extinguish this
rather ingenious but hopelessly
illogical hypothesis.
Later, this Court did act in Belvedere and
agreed with Judge Hersey, quoting parts of
his opinion at length. Most assuredly,
Belvedere established clear principles of law
with regard to riparian and littoral property,
which the majority views as an inconvenient
detail of Florida legal precedent and simply
unnecessarily discards with one sentence
and no analysis as not "controlling or even
particularly relevant." Notwithstanding its
apparent inconvenience to the majority,
Belvedere continues to stand for the
principle of law that riparian or littoral rights
are generally inseparable from riparian or
littoral uplands in this State. Today, the
majority has returned to a "hopelessly
illogical hypothesis" without even an
attempt to advance some rational analysis
that conforms to the Florida Constitution,
our common law, and section 253.141,
Florida Statutes.
Following Belvedere only a short two years
later, this Court again directly addressed the
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fundamental principles of law applicable to
riparian and littoral property, its owners, and
their correlative rights in Board of Trustees
of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v.
Sand Key Associates, Ltd. In very clear and
unmistakable language, we stated:
This Court has expressly adopted the
common law rule that a riparian or
littoral owner owns to the line of the
ordinary high water mark on
navigable waters. We have also held
that riparian or littoral rights are
legal rights and, for constitutional
purposes, the common law rights of
riparian and littoral owners constitute
property. Riparian and littoral
property rights consist not only of
the right to use the water shared by
the public, but include the following
vested rights: (1) the right of access
to the water, including the right to
have the property 's contact with the
water remain intact ....
The majority now avoids this inconvenient
principle of law-and firmly recognized and
protected property right-by improperly
describing the littoral property and its owner
as having "no independent right of contact
with the water," and by mischaracterizing
the significant right of contact as being only
"ancillary" to the right of access. Any claim
that this existing precedent and law does not
apply here is based upon empty, misguided
logic that discounts the essential nature of
littoral property. At least in theory, the
MHWL is the location at which littoral
property contacts the sea, and even the
majority seems to accept this principle. As a
definitional matter, without such contact
with the water, littoral property does not
exist in Florida. Although the MHWL may
be a "dynamic" boundary, until today,
Florida has judicially and legislatively
accommodated these variations without
emasculating the underlying private-
property rights and ownership principles.
Our common law, statutes, and Constitution
indicate that the right of contact with the
water is neither "independent of," nor
"ancillary to," riparian and littoral property,
its ownership, and associated protected
rights. That contact is inherent in, and
essential to, the very heart of the property
we discuss. Without bordering on, lying
contiguous to, or abutting the water, the
property ceases to be "riparian" or "littoral"
by working definition. ...
The problem with the underlying logic and
reasoning of the majority is not really a
matter of just a few yards of sand but is,
instead, its failure to acknowledge and
account for the fundamental result that
occurs in the absence of the inherent right of
contact with the water. Under the legal
principle adopted by the majority, the
Sovereign could now create, widen, and
extend "sovereign" land or a portion of
beach between what should represent the
status-quo-ante MHWL (also known as the
ECL) and the water by hundreds or even
thousands of yards without impacting the
rights of riparian or littoral property owners.
This new-found governmental power could
be used to create extended state-owned or
sovereign lands between the once-private
riparian or littoral property and the water,
thereby effectively severing private property
from the sea, lakes, and rivers, which
instantly converts ocean-front, gulf-front,
lake-front, and river-front property into
something far less. The protection of
property rights in Florida is an essential
element of our organic law, finding a home
in multiple constitutional provisions. In a
similar manner, there are constitutional
limitations upon any encroachment on our
property rights. In this context, we have
recognized the property value of contact
with the water. . ..
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In addition to discounting the right of
contact with the water, the majority skims
the law with regard to riparian and littoral
property ownership, and associated rights, to
proceed into a discussion of erosion,
accretion, reliction, and avulsion as though
those concepts provide the end-all-be-all
response to every question of riparian and
littoral property rights. Although the
Sovereign may have the right to reclaim
land lost through an avulsive event, the
littoral-upland property owner also
maintains property rights to land submerged
through avulsion. The upland owner
continues to hold private-property rights to
the extent and location of the MHWL as it
existed before the storm (i.e., the avulsive
event). In fact, even the majority
affirmatively states: "Consequently, if the
shoreline is lost due to an avulsive event, the
public [through the Sovereign] has the right
to restore its shoreline up to that MHWL."
The majority opinion is actually replete with
inconsistent principles. However, this
particular recognition creates an internal
inconsistency within the majority opinion
because the opinion also states that there is
no right for the littoral-upland property
owner to contact the sea at the MHWL. The
majority adds to this confusion when it
recognizes that "when restoring storm-
ravaged shoreline, the boundary under the
Act should remain the pre-avulsive vent
boundary." Such language indicates that
even the majority recognizes the
definitional, essential requirement in Florida
that littoral property does not exist in the
absence of contact with the sea at the
MHWL, and that this requirement and right
continues "under the Act." This position
directly conflicts with its unfounded
contention that "there is no independent
right of contact with the water."
The majority thus overlooks that the State
may only restore the beach to the pre-
avulsion or pre-critical-erosion MHWL
because of the quintessential aspect of
littoral property under Florida law. As the
Sovereign, the State owns the foreshore in
trust for the public, which is the land
between the AMIFI, and the low-water
mark, while, in contrast, the littoral-upland
holder's ownership continues until. and
includes, the MHWL. Thus, the decision of
the majority to grant the Sovereign the
property right or authority to sever once
riparian or littoral property from the water
by creating as much dry land between the
property and the water as the government
may please is inconsistent with maintaining
the MHWL. This separation may be de
minimis, or a matter of a few yards, but it
could also be a matter of hundreds or even
thousands of yards upon application of the
principle announced today that waterfront
property does not enjoy the protection of a
continuing right of contact with the water.
Under the majority's analysis, this State has
ceased to protect the condition precedent to
all other littoral rights: contact with the sea.
Unlike the majority, I would not interpret
the Act to permit a result that destroys the
essential nature of riparian or littoral
property. If a beach were restored and
renourished without altering the location of
the pre-critical-erosion MHWL (i.e.,
refilling only to restore the MHWL to the
ECL), the Act could be applied without
unconstitutionally severing riparian or
littoral property from its contact with the
water. In contrast, restoration and
renourishment in the form of filling
currently submerged property to separate
riparian or littoral property from the
resulting MHWL simply violates all prior
notions of waterfront property rights in
Florida.
I suggest that contact with the water by
riparian or littoral property is not ancillary,
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independent, or subsidiary to such property
but is essential and inherent to its legal
definition and is an indispensible predicate
for the private owners' possession of other
associated rights. Accordingly, I cannot
agree that the Sovereign may create a
substantially wider "foreshore," which
unnecessarily destroys the inherent and
essential nature of riparian and littoral
property along with valuable property rights.
Under our common law, article ), section
11 of the Florida Constitution, and section
253.141, Florida Statutes, the Sovereign
only owns the land between the MHWL and
the low-water mark (along with the land
under navigable waters), and the private
littoral-upland owner owns the land up to,
and including, the MHWL. I would not
interpret the Act to contradict this prior-
existing, foundational law.
In contrast, the majority has done just that
and, in the process, has destroyed the
inherent and essential nature of privately
held littoral property-contiguity with the
sea. Furthermore, the majority has also
transformed the certified question from one
of constitutionality "as applied" to one of
"facial validity." If the Court construed the
Act in a manner that did NOT sever riparian
or littoral property from the water, we could
maintain its facial validity. Therefore, the
Act may be applied constitutionally, but not
in the manner espoused by the majority.
Under appropriate circumstances (e.g.,
where the ECL does not correspond to the
restored MHWL), the property owners
should retain the right to bring as-applied
challenges to this beach-restoration project.
That appears to be precisely what occurred
in this case. Below, STBR challenged the
local governmental entities' placement of
the ECL 25 and, here, the majority
recognizes that it is unclear whether the
ECL represents the status-quo-ante MHWL.
Further, although the majority mis-
characterizes this action as a facial
challenge, it states that "if the ECL does not
represent the pre-hurricane MHWL, the
resulting boundary between sovereignty and
private property might result in the State
laying claim to a portion of land that, under
the common law, would typically remain
with the private owner." Such state action
constitutes a compensable taking, and
therefore I dissent with regard to the
majority's reversal of the First District and
its mischaracterization of this action as a
facial challenge. In spite of the majority's
desire to destroy protected private-property
rights, nothing in its opinion-which
addresses a judicially rewritten facial
challenge-prevents these property owners
from bringing later as-applied challenges to
this beach-restoration project.
Here, by disclaiming (1) any interest in land
that it does not already own "as sovereign
titleholder" and (2) any intent to deprive
property owners of their littoral rights (other
than accreted portions of land which the
State may readjust to maintain the
reestablished MHWL at the recorded ECL),
the State could sustain the common-law rule
and remain true to its definition of littoral
and riparian rights contained within section
253.141(1), Florida Statutes: "The land to
which the owner holds title must extend to
the ordinary high watermark of the
navigable water in order that riparian [or
littoral] rights may attach." If the State or
applicable "governmental agency" does not
carry out its statutory duty to maintain the
reestablished MHWL at the ECL through
renourishment efforts, it risks returning the
shore to its pre-restoration status, which
means that the MHWL would naturally
move away from the ECL and contiguous
ownership would remain with the littoral-
upland owners, not the State.
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Thus, if the State and our local governments
restore and renourish our beaches so that the
reestablished MHWLs remain at the ECLs,
which may involve additional redistributions
of accreted and eroded sand, then they could
apply the Act in a constitutional manner
because littoral property would retain its
required contact with the sea. Any other
interpretation of this legislation would lead
to several constitutional problems with
regard to uncompensated takings. I cannot
endorse any construction of the Act that
creates, rather than alleviates, constitutional
concerns.
I recognize that beach restoration and
renourishment are critical in Florida and
present many difficult and complex issues. I
have no doubt that the majority has
attempted to balance the respective interests
involved to reach a workable solution.
However, this legislation has not been
constitutionally applied in this case, and no
matter the complexity or difficulty, I suggest
that the private-property rights destroyed
today are also critical and of fundamental
importance. As constitutionally protected
rights slide, it becomes more difficult to
protect others. The rights inherent in private-
property ownership are at the foundation of
this nation and this State. I simply cannot
join a decision which, in my view,
unnecessarily eliminates private-property
rights without providing "full
compensation" as required by article ),
section 6 of the Florida Constitution. While
the Act was applied in an unconstitutional
manner here, it may be constitutionally
applied under other circumstances in a
manner that preserves both the intent of the
Legislature and the quintessential nature of
littoral and riparian property in Florida.
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"Supreme Court Takes up Property-Rights Case"
The Christian ScienceA onitor
June 15, 2009
Warren Richev
The US Supreme Court has agreed to take
up a case examining whether the Florida
Supreme Court violated the private property
rights of waterfront landowners in a seven-
mile-long beach restoration project.
The beach has been eroded by a series of
hurricanes and tropical storms.
At issue in the case is whether the state high
court violated the U.S. Constitution's takings
clause when it upheld a Florida government
plan to create a state-owned public beach, 60
feet to 120 feet wide, between private
waterfront land and the Gulf of Mexico near
Destin, Fla. In effect, the beach
renourishment plan would convert privately
owned waterfront property into waterview
property without any compensation paid to
the landowner, according to lawyers for the
owners.
"This case is the ideal vehicle for [the US
Supreme Court] to finally rein in activist
state courts that continue to invoke non-
existent rules of state substantive law to
avoid takings claims by declaring no
property rights ever existed," writes D. Kent
Safriet, a Tallahassee lawyer in his brief on
behalf of Stop the Beach Renourishment
Inc., a property-owner group.
The high court announced its decision to
hear the case in an order issued on Monday.
Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida
will be argued during the high court's next
term, which begins in October.
Florida's 40-year-old Beach and Shore
Preservation Act establishes a procedure for
the state to restore eroded shorelines.
The seaward boundary of beachfront private
property extends to the mean high water line
(MHWL), a boundary that shifts over time
with the size of the beach. In contrast, the
Shore Preservation Act replaces the MHWL
with a fixed erosion control line (ECL).
Prior to the beach nourishment project, the
owner of the waterfront land enjoyed
potential rights to any additional land from
accretions-should the beach grow seaward.
But once the state sets the ECL, that right no
longer exists, the landowners complain.
State lawyers countered that upland owners
continue to enjoy every preexisting
waterfront property right "except the
potential expansion of her property via
accretions that hypothetically might form
while the ECL is in place."
In upholding the state law against the
landowners, the Florida Supreme Court said
the state has a constitutional duty to protect
Florida's beaches as a vital economic and
natural resource. "As for the upland land
owners, the beach renourishment protects
their property from future storm damage and
erosion while preserving their littoral rights
to access, use, and view," the state high
court declared.
The Florida justices added that the law
achieved a "reasonable balance of interests
and rights to uniquely valuable and volatile
property interests."
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Property owners disagree. They say a
portion of their property interests were taken
by the state without any compensation. "The
Florida Supreme Court's opinion is a
product of judicial engineering to achieve a
desired policy result," Mr. Safriet writes in
his brief.
State officials have suggested that if Florida
were required to pay compensation to
landowners, the resulting financial burden
might "cripple the state's beach
renourishment program," the lawyer says.
The Florida justices, Safriet says, ignored
100 years of state property law to issue their
decision.
A lawyer for Walton County and the City of
Destin disagreed. "The Florida Supreme
Court has simply continued the development
of its own common law-a process which is
not stagnant but fluctuates-in light of real
property developments related to beach
renourishment projects," writes Tampa
lawyer Hala Sandridge, in her brief to the
court.
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"Beach Renourishment Victory: In Long-Awaited Decision, High Court
Says It Is State's Duty to Restore Sand"
Desiin Log
October 1, 2008
Fraser Sherman
Restoring eroded private beaches doesn't
deprive owners of their property rights, the
Florida Supreme Court says.
Although one of two dissenting judges
blasted the majority opinion for "infirm,
tortured logic" and a "desire to destroy
protected private-property rights," on
Monday a 5-2 verdict overruled a 2006
district court decision that a Destin/Walton
County beach restoration project denied the
rights of the affected owners.
"Now that this is over, I hope we can all
move forward in a spirit of harmony,"
Mayor Craig Barker said Monday, "and put
these beaches back the way they used to be."
The court decision focused specifically on
beaches that had suffered heavy erosion,
City Manager Greg Kisela said, rather than
beach restoration in general.
Two property-owners' groups, Save Our
Beaches and Stop the Beach Renourishment,
formed in 2004 to challenge the six-mile
restoration project. Owners objected that
south of a state-set erosion control line
behind their homes, all the expanded beach
would be public land.
Linda Cherry of Save Our Beaches said this
week that restoration opponents were
"reviewing the options" with their attorneys
in light of the court's decision.
"My initial reaction," Cherry said, "is that
the court's ruling means that the government
can permanently take your property in
exchange for a temporary, unwanted and
potentially harmful action."
Some owners, soured by arguments with
Destin over the public's presence on private
beachfront, have said restoration was a land
grab to benefit the city's tourist industry by
packing more bodies onto the beach.
"They want people in front of our houses,"
homeowner Patricia Young said in 2004.
"It's only going to be done for the people
who pack their pockets with money."
The groups challenged the Department of
Environmental Protection's permit for the
project on both administrative and
constitutional grounds. They lost the
administrative challenge; the constitutional
issues moved on to the First District Court.
Save Our Beaches did not, because the court
ruled its approximately 150 members
weren't necessarily owners of properties in
the restoration area.
In 2006, the court ruled that by creating a
stretch of public land between the Gulf and
the private sands, beach restoration removed
owners' right to maintain contact with the
water and also their "right to accretion,"
meaning sand that would have gradually
accumulated on their private beaches would
now widen public property instead.
Walton County, Destin and the DEP
appealed to the state Supreme Court, where
the matter sat until Monday's ruling.
The court ruled against Stop the Beach
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Renourishment on several grounds:
-While accretion no longer benefits the
private beach, erosion won't affect private
property until after it's eaten away the
public land.
Beach restoration doesn't deny the
owners' right to "access, use and view" the
waterfront.
-Sand south of the mean high waterline has
always been state property, and the state has
a right to restore it.
-Being a waterfront owner doesn't literally
mean the edge of your property has to
contact the edge of the Gulf.
In a dissent, Justice R. Fred Lewis said it
was ridiculous to assume the owners had no
"right of contact." He also objected that in
focusing on general constitutional issues, the
decision ignored complaints about the
specific project and whether the erosion-
control line had been placed correctly.
"The win is obviously good news," Barker
said Monday night. "I still believe our intent
has always been to put sand on those
beaches as prescribed state law and to
protect upland structures."
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"Walton Resumes Beach Restoration near Pompano Joe's"
Northiiest Florida Daily Nei's
December 5, 2006
Heather Civil
Beach restoration in Walton County has
resumed after months of delays, and the
project will move into Destin next spring.
Work to pump sand from the East Pass onto
beaches began in South Walton behind
Pompano Joe's restaurant on Scenic Gulf
Drive on Saturday.
Employees at Pompano Joe's have eagerly
awaited beach restoration, said restaurant
manager Vicki Berfanger. "We can already
see a difference," she said. "It's definitely
making a big improvement."
Beach erosion had so narrowed the shore
behind the eatery that storm surge routinely
caused water to rise to the building's back
deck, Berfanger said.
"We're ready for it to be done," she said.
The final 6,300 feet of beach in Walton
County should be finished by the middle of
January, said Brad Pickel, director of beach
management for the Walton County Tourist
Development Council.
"We're very happy to see the project back
under way," he said.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers shut the
project down in May after several
endangered sea turtles got caught in
equipment and died during sand dredging.
The Corps later reversed its decision, and
the TDC has spent the past several weeks
working out a contract with Great Lakes
Dredge and Dock for work to restart.
The project, which covers about four miles
of beach in Walton and two miles of beach
in Destin, originally had a price tag of $22.8
million.
Delays and the expense of getting Great
Lakes to come back after shutting down in
May have added almost $5 million to the
cost.
The price now stands at roughly $27.7
million. Walton's share of that is $19.1
million.
The TDC is using state grant money and
tourist bed-tax revenue to fund the project.
Part of the cost increase includes measures
to reduce the risk of another sea turtle death.
The TDC has hired a trawler to cast nets
near the East Pass and collect and relocate
any sea turtles in that area.
The trawler started working Friday before
the restoration resumed and had a close call
when and endangered leatherback sea turtle
got caught in the net and drowned, Pickel
said.
It happened when the net got snagged on
what the TDC believes is a sunken boat in
the East Pass, he said.
That turtle death does not count against the
restoration project because it happened
during trawling and not during sand
dredging, Pickel said.
Walton County has had to contend with not
396
just sea turtle deaths but a legal battle over
the project since it began in February.
The case has reached the state Supreme
Court, which will determine whether the
project unconstitutionally violates private-
property rights, as several Walton residents
claim.
There is no timeframe for when the court
will issue a ruling.
The TDC has said the restoration will
continue as planned unless the court says
otherwise. Plans call for the project to start
on two miles of beach in Destin early next
April.
That should take about 45 days to complete,
Pickel said. He said he expects the Walton
project to go smoothly and finish on time.
"We've had no delays yet," he said.
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"A Frontline in the Sand Against Erosion"
Northw'est Florida Daily News
August 3, 2005
Robbyn Brooks
Mother Nature-in the form of two
Category 3 hurricanes and two tropical
storms in 10 months-has taken a jagged
bite out of the beaches along Destin and
South Walton County.
Many homes and businesses close to the
Gulf of Mexico are perched dangerously
near water that laps farther upland with
every passing storm.
But beach restoration proposed years ago
when miles of beach were first declared
critically eroded still hasn't begun, a result
of legal fighting.
"Our only salvation is beach restoration,"
said Peggy Criser, who lost her home in
Miramar Beach when Hurricane Dennis hit
July 10. "As the storm started spinning
toward us, it was like watching the Grim
Reaper in the distance. We knew we were
doomed."
Criser bought her home 19 years ago when it
was a wood-shingled structure and
remodeled the gulf-front house, adding
furnishings from her travels. It was listed on
the market for $2.3 million before Dennis,
but now all that remains of her home is a
pile of wood and rubble scattered on the
sand.
"I'm sitting here itemizing my life over the
last 20 years to turn in to the insurance
company," she said. "It is a sobering thing
for anyone to go through to say the least."
Hurricane Dennis washed away $12 million
of sand and vegetation and damaged $11
million of property in Destin, according to
early estimates from the city and Okaloosa
County.
Extreme winds and crashing waves from the
summer storm also displaced as much as
two million cubic yards of sand in Walton
County. Officials estimate it could cost $25
a cubic yard to replace it.
"There will continue to be significant home
damage if no long-term solution is made,"
said Colleen Castille, secretary of the
Florida Department of Environmental
Protection.
The DEP has issued emergency beach
scraping permits to build sand berms for
Destin and Walton County, but Castille
called that measure a "Band-Aid" approach.
Destin and Walton County entered into a
joint partnership in 1999 when a restoration
feasibility study was ordered, and funding
was soon made available to extend area
beaches 80 to 100 feet across two miles of
beach in the city and 4.5 miles in the county.
Soon after the planning phase ended, a small
group of beachfront property owners legally
challenged the constitutionality of the
project.
An administrative judge in Walton County
sided in favor of the restoration project in
late June. But a circuit judge in Leon County
issued a statement on July 20 citing that
there was not enough evidence from either
side to issue a summary judgment in the
case.
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The case could now move to a formal trial if
the plaintiffs choose to pursue one. D. Kent
Safriet, a Tallahassee attorney representing
the restoration opponents, did not return a
phone call seeking comment.
Plaintiffs in the case continue to oppose
restoration. Meanwhile, planning has begun
anew for the restoration project.
"This lawsuit is about the City of Destin
government attempting to take private
property under cover of 'saving the beach,"'
said Shannon Goessling, director of the
Southeastern Legal Foundation. "Public
relations efforts by the City of Destin
government aside, the (initial) lawsuit filed
by Save Our Beaches is not about keeping
beach renourishment from taking place."
The legal foundation has been hired to
represent beachfront homeowners in the
fight against Destin and its beach access
policy that allows for public use of the beach
20 feet upland of the mean high water mark.
Although the foundation isn't representing
property owners in their restoration legal
challenge, Goessling said it would offer any
assistance possible because restoration
would add more public beach in front of
private homes.
The homeowner group initially challenged
the restoration plan in court, stating it would
take away their rights to any natural land
expansion because the accretion would
occur on beach added through state funding
and become public property.
One of the plaintiffs, Denny Jones, owns a
gulf-front home in Crystal Beach. He said
the City of Destin offered to add 50 feet of
beach to his lot and then continue with more
land for public use.
"They're trying to sell me with this, 'You're
going to gain all this sand because that will
now be your property.' Jones said.
-They're not trying to help us. They're
trying to bring more tourists in here."
Jones and other restoration opponents have
come under fire from some beachfront
property owners after Hurricane Dennis.
Pat Young, another Crystal Beach resident
opposed to restoration, said she has received
antagonizing phone calls but has no
intention of giving up the struggle against
Destin and South Walton County.
Restoration proponents believe adding sand
to the beaches is in the best interest of the
community as a whole.
"The damage we saw this year could be
deadly for us," said Destin grants manager
Lindey Chabot. "The charter boat captains,
condominiums, beach shops ... they all rely
on tourists and I just don't know if we can
get the season back."
Tourism generates an estimated $188
million a year in Destin, and $685 million in
Walton County-nearly all of which is tied
to the beach.
"Our visitors are showing up and are
obviously disappointed in the shape of the
beaches," said Destin Chamber of
Commerce CEO Shane Moody. "As word
gets out about the erosion, I fear people will
change their minds about coming here."
A Walton County Tourist Development
Council official said it may be the end of
summer before tourism losses from Dennis
can be calculated.
"We are still doing assessments to see how
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bad it is," said Tracy Louthain w ith the
TDC.
The real estate market in Destin and South
Walton County has also suffered.
"We are feeling it," said Debbie Gericke
with Coldwell Banker JME Realty, "and we
are seeing an increase in bottom fishing
definitely."
Gericke said her office has taken many calls
from investors looking to buy property that
sustained significant damage from Dennis in
hopes of turning a quick buck.
The red-hot real estate market along the
Emerald Coast had cooled over the past
several months. But Gericke said sales have
stalled since the beginning of this year's
active hurricane season. In one JME office,
real estate agents have taken $18 million in
listings but have sold only $4 million worth
of property.
"It's not going to be something we bounce
back from suddenly," Gericke said.
But even as beach restoration planning
begins anew, it won't provide a quick
resolution to the beach erosion affecting
nearly 13,000 jobs dependent on guests to
the area and an economy driven by tourist
dollars. Restoration will take years.
Representatives from Taylor Engineering,
the firm hired to research and plan the
project, are re-evaluating the critically
eroded beaches in the area and updating
their design.
Although engineers will need several
months to revamp their plan for the beaches
of Destin and South Walton County, beach
restoration could begin before Nov. 1, the
end of turtle nesting season. The project will
still be for the original 6.5 miles of beach
slated for restoration, but it is evident that
the entire beach along Walton County and
Destin is critically eroded.
Project engineer Mike Trudnak said
planners are limited because of the amount
of sand in the ebb shoal of Destin's East
Pass, the borrow site for the project.
"I was pretty amazed at how much dune area
was lost," Trudnak said. "That will take
some of the depth we had on to rebuild that
area."
Engineers estimate it would take nearly one
million years for restoration to occur
naturally.
"The area needs restoration," Trudnak said.
"It's ridiculous to think it doesn't."
Walton County Beach Management
Coordinator Brad Pickel said the project has
become "life or death."
"Beach restoration projects generally focus
on shore protection," Pickel said. "But I
think our project has morphed into
something much more."
Debris and unearthed cypress tree remains
have raised safety issues. Pickel also said
emergency vehicles are having trouble
traversing the shrinking shoreline in some
areas, such as the beach adjacent to Costa
del Sol townhomes in Walton County.
"There is no sand left in our system to fight
any more storms," Pickel said. "The tidal
erosion has been too great and I just don't
know what will become of our homes and
environment and economy if we don't
undergo beach restoration."
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"Judge Says Renourishment Permit Should Be Issued"
Northwt'est Florida Daily Newts
July 6, 2005
Heather Civil
An administrative law judge's
recommendation has moved Destin and
Walton County a step closer to starting a
beach renourishment project, but a separate
court case could still stop it from becoming
a reality.
In an opinion issued late last week, Judge J.
Lawrence Johnston recommended issuance
of a Department of Environmental
Protection permit to add sand to about seven
miles of beach in Walton County and
Destin.
The groups Save Our Beaches and Stop the
Beach Renourishment challenged the
legality of the DEP permit last year. They
claim that renourishment violates their
private property rights, because the final 100
feet of added beach would become public
property.
In his recommendation, Johnston said that
the project offers "no unreasonable
infringement" of those rights, and he
recommended "approval of the beach
restoration." Members of the opposition
could not be reached for comment Tuesday.
Though the news is good, Walton and
Destin have yet to hear another judge's
decision regarding another legal challenge to
the project.
The opposition took the issue to court in
Tallahassee in May to challenge the
constitutionality of the Beach
Renourishment Act and the application of
the act in the Destin-Walton County
restoration effort. The judge has not made a
ruling in that case.
"(Johnston's ruling) is another step in the
right direction," said Kriss Titus, executive
director of the Walton County Tourist
Development Council. "We're still waiting
on the (other) judge." The renourishment
project will dredge sand from the East Pass
and deposit it in Walton and Destin to
replace critically eroded beaches.
Walton and Destin have not yet received a
project permit from the DEP and cannot
begin work without it.
The city hopes to begin its side of the
project soon, said Lindey Chabot, city grants
and projects manager.
"We're very excited and pleased," she said.
Walton County still holds out some hope to
begin work this fall, Titus said.
But as the tropical storm activity begins to
pick up in the Gulf of Mexico, she said that
she's not sure the project can start before
storm season gets too far under way.
"I'm wondering what will happen without
the renourishment," she said.
Miramar Beach in Walton County suffers
from some of the worst beach erosion and
could benefit the most from the
renourishment project, said Dan Tomasek,
who owns property in Miramar Beach. He
said that he is anxious to see how the other
court case turns out.
"We are desperately in need of the sand," he
said. "(But) the rest of the good news
remains to be heard. There are a multitude
of issues that need to be resolved."
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"Justices Uphold Taking Property for Development"
The New York Times
June 24, 2005
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court ruled on Thursday, in
one of its most closely watched property
rights cases in years, that fostering economic
development is an appropriate use of the
government's power of eminent domain.
The 5-to-4 decision cleared the way for the
City of New London, Conn., to proceed with
a large-scale plan to replace a faded
residential neighborhood with office space
for research and development, a conference
hotel, new residences and a pedestrian
"riverwalk" along the Thames River.
The project, to be leased and built by private
developers, is intended to derive maximum
benefit for the city from a $350 million
research center built nearby by the Pfizer
pharmaceutical company.
New London, deemed a "distressed
municipality" by the state 15 years ago, has
a high unemployment rate and fewer
residents today than it had in 1920.
The owners of 15 homes in the Fort
Trumbull neighborhood, including one
woman who was born in her house 87 years
ago and has lived there since, had resisted
the plan and refused the city's offer of
compensation.
After the city condemned the properties in
November 2000, the homeowners went to
state court to argue that the taking would be
unconstitutional. The Connecticut Supreme
Court upheld the use of eminent domain in a
ruling last year.
In affirming that decision, the majority
opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens
resolved a question that had surprisingly
gone unanswered for all the myriad times
that governments have used their power
under the Fifth Amendment to take private
property for public use. The question was
the definition of "public use."
The homeowners, represented by a public-
interest law firm, the Institute for Justice,
which has conducted a national litigation
campaign against what it calls eminent
domain abuse, argued that taking property to
enable private economic development, even
development that would provide a public
benefit by enhancing the tax base, could
never be a "public use."
In its view, the only transfers of property
that qualified were those that gave actual
ownership or use to the public, like for a
highway or a public utility.
But the majority concluded on Thursday that
public use was properly defined more
broadly as "public purpose." Justice Stevens
noted that earlier Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the public use clause of the Fifth
Amendment had allowed the use of eminent
domain to redevelop a blighted
neighborhood in Washington, to redistribute
land ownership in Hawaii and to assist a
gold-mining company, in a decision by
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1906.
"Promoting economic development is a
traditional and long accepted function of
government," Justice Stevens said, adding,
"Clearly, there is no basis for exempting
economic development from our
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traditionally broad understanding of public
purpose.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor objected that "the words 'for
public use' do not realistically exclude any
takings, and thus do not exert any constraint
on the eminent domain power."
Justice O'Connor said, "Under the banner of
economic development. all private property
is now vulnerable to being taken and
transferred to another private owner, so long
as it might be upgraded."
Justice Stevens, examining the New London
plan in light of the majority's general
analysis, said the plan "unquestionably
serves a public purpose," even though it was
intended to increase jobs and tax revenue
rather than remove blight.
He described the plan as "carefully
formulated" and comprehensive. Sounding a
federalism note, Justice Stevens said that
state legislatures and courts were best at
"discerning local public needs" and that the
judgment of the New London officials was
"entitled to our deference."
Justices Stephen G. Breyer, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy and David
H. Souter joined the majority opinion in
Kelo v. City of New London, No. 04-108.
Justice Kennedy also wrote a separate
concurring opinion to emphasize that while
there was no suggestion in this instance that
the plan was intended to favor any
individual developer, "a court confronted
with a plausible accusation of impermissible
favoritism to private parties should treat the
objection as a serious one and review the
record to see it if has merit."
Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion was
joined by Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist and by Justices Antonin Scalia
and Clarence Thomas. She wrote that rather
than adhering to its precedents, the court had
strayed from them by endorsing economic
development as an appropriate public use.
"Who among us can say she already makes
the most productive or attractive use of her
property?" Justice O'Connor asked.
She added: "The specter of condemnation
hangs over all property. Nothing is to
prevent the state from replacing any Motel 6
with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a
shopping mall or any farm with a factory."
Both Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas,
who also filed his own dissent, said the
decision's burden would fall on the less
powerful and wealthy.
"The government now has license to transfer
property from those with fewer resources to
those with more," Justice O'Connor said.
"The founders cannot have intended this
perverse result."
Justice Thomas, who called the decision "far
reaching and dangerous," cited several
studies showing that those displaced by
urban renewal and "slum clearance" over the
years tended to be lower-income minority
residents.
"The court has erased the Public Use Clause
from our Constitution," he said.
In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens said,
"The necessity and wisdom of using eminent
domain power to promote economic
development are certainly matters of
legitimate public debate."
The court did not "minimize the hardship
that condemnations may entail," he said,
despite the fact that the homeowners will
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receive "just compensation."
Justice Stevens said that states remained free
to place restrictions on their own use of
eminent domain power through their own
constitutions and laws, as many have;
California, for example, has a law restricting
to blighted areas the use of eminent domain
for economic development.
Scott G. Bullock, the lawyer who argued the
case for the New London homeowners. said
in an interview that his organization, the
Institute for Justice, would accept the court's
invitation and "continue the fight in the state
supreme courts." As a result of the decision,
he said, "we are going to see more eminent
domain abuse and a growing grass-roots
rebellion against this type of government
action."
Allan B. Taylor, a partner in the Hartford
law firm Day, Berry & Howard who filed a
brief on New London's behalf for the
Connecticut Conference of Municipalities
and organizations of cities in 31 other states,
said an opposite outcome in this case would
have ushered in an "extraordinary
revolution."
If the court had not upheld the Connecticut
Supreme Court, he said in an interview, "it
would greatly limit what cities and towns all
over the country could do." Mr. Taylor said
he read the opinion not as a green light for
the wholesale use of eminent domain, but as
"a green light for continuing to do careful
and responsible planning."
The decision was a clear defeat for the long-
term effort by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia to limit government control
over private property. Although a series of
decisions from the mid-1980s through the
early 90s had appeared to indicate a major
shift in the court's traditional deference to
government land-use policies, that effort has
stalled in recent cases. By the same token,
the decision was the latest success for
Justice Stevens, the 85-year-old senior
associate justice, who appears to be having
one of the most productive terms in his 30
years on the Supreme Court.
The New London case was among the final
decisions the court was expected to make in
this term. The court indicated that Monday
would be the final day of the term.
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Kiyemba v. Obama
08-1234
Ruling Below: Kienba v. Obana, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
District court overstepped its authority in ordering the government to bring to the United States,
and subsequently to release here, 17 Chinese citizens being wrongfully detained as enemy
combatants at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba. Political branches have exclusive power to
determine the admissibility of aliens to the United States, and the district court failed to identify
any statute, treaty, or constitutional provision authorizing its action.
Question Presented: Exercising its habeas jurisdiction as confirmed by Boumediene v. Bush,
does federal court have no power to order the release of prisoners held by the executive for seven
years when that executive detention is indefinite without authorization in law, and the release
into the continental United States is the only possible effective remedy?
Jamal KIYEMBA, Next Friend, et al., Appellees
V.
Barack H. OBAMA, President of the United States, et al., Appellants
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Decided February 18, 2009
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge:
Seventeen Chinese citizens currently held at
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba,
brought petitions for writs of habeas corpus.
Each petitioner is an ethnic Uighur, a Turkic
Muslim minority whose members reside in
the Xinjiang province of far-west China.
The question is whether, as the district court
ruled, petitioners are entitled to an order
requiring the government to bring them to
the United States and release them here.
Sometime before September 11, 2001,
petitioners left China and traveled to the
Tora Bora mountains in Afghanistan, where
they settled in a camp with other Uighurs.
Petitioners fled to Pakistan when U.S. aerial
strikes destroyed the Tora Bora camp. Id.
Eventually they were turned over to the U.S.
military, transferred to Guantanamo Bay and
detained as "enemy combatants."
Evidence produced at hearings before
Combatant Status Review Tribunals in
Guantanamo indicated that at least some
petitioners intended to fight the Chinese
government, and that they had received
firearms training at the camp for this
purpose. The Tribunals determined that the
petitioners could be detained as enemy
combatants because the camp was run by the
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, a
Uighur independence group the military
believes to be associated with al Qaida or
the Taliban, and which the State Department
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designated as a terrorist organization three
years after the petitioners' capture.
In the Parhat case, the court ruled that the
government had not presented sufficient
evidence that the Eastern Turkistan Islamic
Movement was associated with al Qaida or
the Taliban, or had engaged in hostilities
against the United States or its coalition
partners. Parhat therefore could not be held
as an enemy combatant. The government
saw no material differences in its evidence
against the other Uighurs, and therefore
decided that none of the petitioners should
be detained as enemy combatants.
Releasing petitioners to their country of
origin poses a problem. Petitioners fear that
if they are returned to China they will face
arrest, torture or execution. United States
policy is not to transfer individuals to
countries where they will be subject to
mistreatment. Petitioners have not sought to
comply with the immigration laws
governing an alien's entry into the United
States. Diplomatic efforts to locate an
appropriate third country in which to resettle
them are continuing. In the meantime,
petitioners are held under the least restrictive
conditions possible in the Guantanamo
military base.
As relief in their habeas cases, petitioners
moved for an order compelling their release
into the United States. Although the district
court assumed that the government initially
detained petitioners in compliance with the
law, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig.,
the court thought the government no longer
had any legal authority to hold them. As to
the appropriate relief, the court
acknowledged that historically the authority
to admit aliens into this country rested
exclusively with the political branches.
Nevertheless, the court held that the
''exceptional" circumstances of this case and
the need to safeguard "an individual's
liberty from unbridled executive flat,"
justified granting petitioners' motion.
Our analysis begins with several firmly
established propositions set forth in
Saav'edra Bruno v. Albright, from which we
borrow. There is first the ancient principle
that a nation-state has the inherent right to
exclude or admit foreigners and to prescribe
applicable terms and conditions for their
exclusion or admission. This principle,
dating from Roman times, received
recognition during the Constitutional
Convention and has continued to be an
important postulate in the foreign relations
of this country and other members of the
international community.
For more than a century, the Supreme Court
has recognized the power to exclude aliens
as "inherent in sovereignty, necessary for
maintaining normal international relations
and defending the country against foreign
encroachments and dangers-a power to be
exercised exclusively by the political
branches of government" and not "granted
away or restrained on behalf of any one."
Ever since the decision in the Chinese
Exclusion Case, the Court has, without
exception, sustained the exclusive power of
the political branches to decide which aliens
may, and which aliens may not, enter the
United States, and on what terms.
With respect to the exclusive power of the
political branches in this area, there is, as the
Supreme Court stated in Galvan, "not
merely 'a page of history,' . . . but a whole
volume. Policies pertaining to the entry of
aliens and their right to remain here are
peculiarly concerned with the political
conduct of government." Justice Frankfurter
summarized the law as it continues to this
day: "Ever since national States have come
into being, the right of the people to enjoy
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the hospitality of a State of which they are
not citizens has been a matter of political
determination by each State"-a matter
"wholly outside the concern and competence
of the Judiciary."
As a result, it "is not within the province of
any court, unless expressly authorized by
law, to review the determination of the
political branch of the Government to
exclude a given alien." With respect to these
seventeen petitioners, the Executive Branch
has determined not to allow them to enter
the United States. The critical question is:
what law "expressly authorized" the district
court to set aside the decision of the
Executive Branch and to order these aliens
brought to the United States and released in
Washington, D.C.?
The district court cited no statute or treaty
authorizing its order, and we are aware of
none. As to the Constitution, the district
court spoke only generally. The court said
there were "constitutional limits," that there
was some "constitutional imperative," that it
needed to protect "the fundamental right of
liberty." These statements suggest that the
court may have had the Fifth Amendment's
due process clause in mind. But the due
process clause cannot support the court's
order of release. Decisions of the Supreme
Court and of this court-decisions the
district court did not acknowledge-hold
that the due process clause does not apply to
aliens without property or presence in the
sovereign territory of the United States. The
district court, no less than a panel of this
court, must follow those decisions.
The district court also sought to support its
order by invoking the idea embodied in the
maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium-where there
is a right, there is a remedy. We do not
believe the maxim reflects federal statutory
or constitutional law. Not every violation of
a right yields a remedy, even when the right
is constitutional. Application of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity to defeat a remedy is
one common example. Another example,
closer to this case, is application of the
political question doctrine. More than that.
the right-remedy dichotomy is not so clear-
cut. As Justice Holmes warned, "[s]uch
words as 'right' are a constant solicitation to
fallacy." Ubi jus, ibi remedium cannot tell
us whether petitioners have a right to have a
court order their release into the United
States. Whatever the force of this maxim, it
cannot overcome established law that an
"alien who seeks admission to this country
may not do so under any claim of right.
Admission of aliens to the United States is a
privilege granted by the sovereign United
States Government. Such a privilege is
granted to an alien only upon such terms as
the United States shall prescribe."
Much of what we have just written served as
the foundation for the Supreme Court's
opinion in Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei, a case analogous to this one in
several ways. The government held an alien
at the border (Ellis Island, New York). He
had been denied entry into the United States
under the immigration laws. But no other
country was willing to receive him. The
Court ruled that the alien, who petitioned for
a writ of habeas corpus, had not been
deprived of any constitutional rights. In so
ruling the Court necessarily rejected the
proposition that because no other country
would take Mezei, the prospect of indefinite
detention entitled him to a court order
requiring the Attorney General to release
him into the United States. As the Supreme
Court saw it, the Judiciary could not
question the Attorney General's judgment.
Neither Zadvydas, nor Clark v. Martinez, are
to the contrary. Petitioners are incorrect in
viewing these cases as holding that the
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constitutional "liberty interests of
concededly illegal aliens trumps [sic]
statutory detention power pending exclusion
once that detention becomes indefinite."
Both cases rested on the Supreme Court's
interpretation not of the Constitution, but of
a provision in the immigration laws-a
provision, the Court acknowledged,
Congress had the prerogative of altering. It
is true that Zadvydas spoke of an alien's due
process rights, but the Court was careful to
restrict its statement to aliens who had
already entered the United States. It was on
that ground that the Court distinguished
Mezei. The distinction is one that "runs
throughout immigration law." The Court
stated: "It is well established that certain
constitutional protections available to
persons inside the United States are
unavailable to aliens outside of our
geographic borders."
And so we ask again: what law authorized
the district court to order the government to
bring petitioners to the United States and
release them here? It cannot be that because
the court had habeas jurisdiction, it could
fashion the sort of remedy petitioners
desired. The courts in Knauff and in Mezei
also had habeas jurisdiction, yet in both
cases the Supreme Court held that the
decision whether to allow an alien to enter
the country was for the political
departments, not the Judiciary. Petitioners
and the amici supporting them invoke the
tradition of the Great Writ as a protection of
liberty. As part of that tradition, they say, a
court with habeas jurisdiction has always
had the power to order the prisoner's release
if he was being held unlawfully. But as in
Munaf v. Geren, petitioners are not seeking
" simple release." Far from it. They asked
for, and received, a court order compelling
the Executive to release them into the
United States outside the framework of the
immigration laws. Whatever may be the
content of common law habeas corpus, we
are certain that no habeas court since the
time of Edward I ever ordered such an
extraordinary remedy.
An undercurrent of petitioners' arguments is
that they deserve to be released into this
country after all they have endured at hands
of the United States. But such sentiments,
however high-minded, do not represent a
legal basis for upsetting settled law and
overriding the prerogatives of the political
branches. We do not know whether all
petitioners or any of them would qualify for
entry or admission under the immigration
laws. We do know that there is insufficient
evidence to classify them as enemy
combatants-enemies, that is, of the United
States. But that hardly qualifies petitioners
for admission. Nor does their detention at
Guantanamo for many years entitle them to
enter the United States. Whatever the scope
of habeas corpus, the writ has never been
compensatory in nature. The government
has represented that it is continuing
diplomatic attempts to find an appropriate
country willing to admit petitioners, and we
have no reason to doubt that it is doing so.
Nor do we have the power to require
anything more.
We have the following response to Judge
Rogers's separate opinion.
1. Judge Rogers: "The power to grant the
writ means the power to order release."
No matter how often or in what form Judge
Rogers repeats this undisputed
proposition-and repeat it she does-it will
not move us any closer to resolving this
case. The question here is not whether
petitioners should be released, but where.
That question was not presented in
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Boumediene and the Court never addressed
it. As we wrote earlier, never in the history
of habeas corpus has any court thought it
had the power to order an alien held
overseas brought into the sovereign territory
of a nation and released into the general
population. As we have also said, in the
United States, who can come in and on what
terms is the exclusive province of the
political branches. In response, Judge
Rogers has nothing to say.
2. Judge Rogers: "[T]he district court erred
by ordering release into the country without
first ascertaining whether the immigration
laws provided a valid basis for detention as
the Executive alternatively suggested."
This statement, and others like it throughout
the separate opinion, is confused and
confusing. First of all, the government has
never asserted, here or in the district court,
that it is holding petitioners pursuant to the
immigration laws. None of the petitioners
has violated any of our immigration laws.
How could they? To presume otherwise-as
Judge Rogers does throughout her separate
opinion-is strange enough.
Stranger still, Judge Rogers charges the
district court with acting "prematurely" in
ordering petitioners' release into the United
States. How so? As she sees it, the district
court should have first determined whether,
under the immigration laws, petitioners were
eligible to enter the country or were
excludable. But no one-not the
government, not petitioners, not the amici-
no one suggested that the court should, or
could, make any such determination.
What then is Judge Rogers talking about
when she insists on evaluating petitioners'
eligibility for admission under the
immigration laws? None of the petitioners
has even applied for admission. Perhaps she
thinks a court should decide which, if any,
of the petitioners would have been admitted
if they had applied. But deciding that at this
stage is impossible. A brief survey of
immigration law shows why.
Eligibility turns in part on what status the
alien is seeking. The immigration laws
presume that those applying for entry seek
permanent resident status. Such persons
must first obtain an immigrant visa from a
consular officer. But the consular officer can
only act after a petition is filed with the
Secretary of Homeland Security, showing
the immigrant status for which the alien
qualifies. The consular officer then has the
exclusive authority to make the final
decision about the issuance of any such
immigrant visa. That decision is not
judicially reviewable.
Worldwide limits on immigration are set out
in 8 U.S.C. § 1151. Additionally, there are
limitations on the number of visas that can
be issued to immigrants from any one
particular country. Immigrants are divided
into three categories: family-sponsored
immigrants; employment-based immigrants;
and diversity immigrants. For employment-
based immigrants, first preference is given
to "priority workers," which include aliens
with extraordinary ability in sciences, arts,
education, business, or athletics;
"outstanding professors and researchers,";
and "certain multinational executives and
managers." There are lower preference
categories unnecessary to set forth.
Suppose the eligibility of any of the
petitioners was determined on the basis that
they were seeking only temporary
admission. Here again, to be admitted as a
nonimmigrant in any of the categories set
forth in the margin, the alien must apply for
a visa. Different classes have different
requirements for what the alien must do to
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obtain a visa, but all require that the alien
submit some form.
Suppose the petitioners' eligibility for
admission turned on whether they could be
considered refugees or asylum seekers. An
alien seeking refugee or asylum status
(refugees apply from abroad; asylum
applicants apply when already here) must
qualify as a "refugee" as defined in 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(42). Whether they could be
admitted under this heading depends on
numerical limitations established by the
President, and on the discretion of the
Attorney General or the Secretary of
Homeland Security. To qualify as a refugee,
an alien must (1) not be firmly resettled in a
foreign country, (2) be of "special
humanitarian concern" to the United States,
and (3) be admissible as an immigrant under
the immigration laws. Although the
Attorney General and the Secretary are
given discretion to waive many of the
grounds of inadmissibility for a refugee
applicant, the statute specifically prohibits
waiver of the "terrorist activity" ground.
The parole remedy, 8 U.S.C.
§ 11 82(d)(5)(A), not only is granted in the
exclusive discretion of the Secretary of
Homeland Security, but also is specifically
limited to "any alien applying for
admission." The section also provides that
no alien who would more properly be
considered a refugee should be paroled
unless the Secretary specifically determines
that "compelling reasons in the public
interest" argue in favor of the parole
remedy.
There are many more complications, but the
bottom line is clear. Aliens are not eligible
for admission into the United States unless
they have applied for admission. Numerical
limits may render them ineligible, as may
many other considerations. The Secretary
has wide discretion with respect to several
categories of applicants and the decisions of
consular officers on visa applications are not
subject to judicial review. And so we find it
impossible to understand what Judge Rogers
is thinking when she insists, for instance,
that "the district court erred by ordering
release into the country without first
ascertaining whether the immigration laws
provided a valid basis for detention" of
someone who (a) has never entered or
attempted to enter the country, and (b) has
never applied for admission under the
immigration laws.
3. Judge Rogers: -[T]he majority has recast
the traditional inquiry of a habeas court from
whether the Executive has shown that the
detention of the petitioners is lawful to
whether the petitioners can show that the
habeas court is 'expressly authorized' to
order aliens brought into the United States."
Judge Rogers fails to mention that the
"expressly authorized" quotation in our
opinion is taken from a Supreme Court
opinion in a habeas case. We repeat with
some additional emphasis: it "is not within
the province of any court, unless expressly
authorized by law, to review the
determination of the political branch of the
Government to exclude a given alien."
When Judge Rogers finally confronts
Knauff how does she deal with the Supreme
Court's opinion? She calls it an "outlier," as
if her label could erase the case from the
United States Reports. We know and she
knows that the lower federal courts may not
disregard a Supreme Court precedent even if
they think that later cases have weakened its
force. With respect to Knauff later cases
have reinforced, not lessened, its
precedential value.
4. Judge Rogers: "[T]he majority has
mischaracterized relevant precedent."
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Judge Rogers is referring to our discussion
of the Supreme Court decisions in Clark and
Zadvydas. We made two points about the
cases. The first was that both rested on
statutory provisions that are not involved
here. Judge Rogers acknowledges the
correctness of our view. Our second point
was that as far as a court's releasing an alien
into the country temporarily pursuant to
statutory authority, there was a clear
distinction between aliens within the United
States and those "outside our geographic
borders." How does Judge Rogers deal with
this distinction? She claims that Boumediene
"rejected this territorial rationale as to
Guantanamo." But as the Court recognized,
it had never extended any constitutional
rights to aliens detained outside the United
States; Boumediene therefore specifically
limited its holding to the Suspension Clause.
the Executive can point to no legal
justification for detention and to no
foreseeable path of release. I cannot join the
court's analysis because it is not faithful to
Boumediene and would compromise both
the Great Writ as a check on arbitrary
detention and the balance of powers over
exclusion and admission and release of
aliens into the United States recognized by
the Supreme Court to reside in the Congress,
the Executive, and the habeas court.
Furthermore, that conclusion is unnecessary
because this court cannot yet know if
detention is justified here. Due to the posture
of this case, the district court has yet to hear
from the Executive regarding the
immigration laws, which the Executive had
asserted may form an alternate basis for
detention. The district court thus erred in
granting release prematurely, and I therefore
concur in the judgment.
I.
The judgment of the district court is
REVERSED and the cases are
REMANDED for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring in the
judgment:
In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court
held that detainees in the military prison at
Guantanamo Bay ("Guantanamo") are
"entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus to
challenge the legality of their detentions,"
and that a "habeas court must have the
power to order the conditional release of an
individual unlawfully detained." Today the
court nevertheless appears to conclude that a
habeas court lacks authority to order that a
non-"enemy combatant" alien be released
into the country (as distinct from be
admitted under the immigration laws) when
The Executive chose not to file returns to the
petitions for writs of habeas corpus for a
majority of the petitioners. After several
hearings and briefing, the district court
determined that the Executive neither
claimed petitioners were "enemy
combatants" or otherwise dangerous, nor
charged them with a crime, nor pointed to
other statutory grounds for detention, nor
presented reliable evidence that they posed a
threat to U.S. interests. The Executive also
did not deny it detained the petitioners. The
district court understood the Executive to
argue instead that it had extra-statutory
"wind-up" authority to repatriate petitioners
and that the district court in any case lacked
the authority to order them released into the
United States. Rejecting both of these
rationales-the first in view of the years in
which the Executive had unsuccessfully
sought to find a country that would receive
the petitioners without risk of their being
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tortured, the second in view of Boumediene
and the need to afford an effective habeas
rcmedy-the district court granted the
petitions, which sought release into the
country. Ruling the Executive had shown no
lawful basis for what had become indefinite
detention, the district court concluded
petitioners must be brought before the court
and released.
However, in the district court the Executive
had also pointed to a possible separate
ground for detention that the district court
did not resolve-namely that petitioners
were excludable under the immigration
statutes and could be detained pending
removal proceedings. The Executive had
also sought a stay so it could evaluate
petitioners' status under the immigration
laws and present the views of the
Department of Homeland Security. The
district court declined to stay the
proceedings, noting that petitioners had
already been imprisoned for seven years and
delay had been "the name of the game" in
the Executive's litigation strategy. Instead
the district court ordered the petitioners
immediately released into the United States,
with a hearing to follow a week later at
which time the position of Homeland
Security could be presented. At that time,
the district court intended to consider
conditions for petitioners' continued release.
The district court also purported to restrain
the Executive from taking petitioners into
custody pursuant to the immigration statutes
during the week prior to the hearing.
In so proceeding, the district court erred by
ordering release into the country without
first ascertaining whether the immigration
laws provided a valid basis for detention as
the Executive alternatively suggested. The
court seems to have relied on Zadvydas v.
Davis, and Clark v. Martinez, for the
proposition that petitioners could no longer
be detained. But in those cases the Supreme
Court first assessed the Executive's
arguments that it had the right to detain
under the immigration statutes before
finding that power had expired and ordering
release. In so doing, the Court gave effect to
both the province of the Great Writ as a
check on unjustified detention and the power
of the political branches over exclusion and
admission of aliens into the country. To
instead order release before assessing
asserted legal authority for detention is
incompatible with the obligation of a habeas
court. Even if the Executive's delay in
raising the immigration statutes as a basis
for detention appears troubling given its
opportunity to file returns to the writs, as the
petitioners asserted they did not seek an
immigration remedy, the Executive cannot
have waived the argument when it raised the
argument in response to the district court's
rejection of its other rationales for detention.
Because the district court could not properly
order release into this country when it could
not yet knowx whether detention was
justified, I concur in the judgment vacating
the release order. Because the question of
whether the immigration statutes provide
that justification "cannot be resolved at this
stage," I would remand the case for that
determination to-be made.
II.
In reversing and remanding, the majority has
written broadly, apparently concluding that a
habeas court is without power to order the
release into this country of Guantanamo
detainees whom the Executive would prefer
to detain indefinitely, where there is no legal
basis for that detention, including no
contention that these petitioners are "enemy
combatants" or a showing that they are even
dangerous. Because this court does not
know if detention could be authorized here,
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the majority need not reach that issue. More
fundamentally, its analysis compromises
both the Great Writ as a check on arbitrary
detention, effectively suspending the writ
contrary to the Suspension Clause, art. 1,§ 9, cl. 2, and the balance of powers
regarding exclusion and admission and
release of aliens into the country recognized
by the Supreme Court to reside in the
Congress, the Executive, and the habeas
court. Consequently, I cannot join it.
A.
The Executive urges this court to recognize
an extra-statutory, perhaps constitutional,
Executive power to detain in order to
prevent an alien from entering the United
States. Supreme Court precedent indicates
there is no such power, and the Executive's
authority to exclude and remove aliens, and
to detain them to effect that end, must come
from an explicit congressional delegation, as
the majority's citations confirm. It would be
surprising under our constitutional system if
the law were otherwise. Even the single
apparent outlier to this line of precedent,
which stated that the power to exclude aliens
"stems not alone from legislative power but
is inherent in the executive power to control
the foreign affairs of the nation," U.S. ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, is no outlier at all. In
Knauff the Court upheld the challenged
action because it was authorized by statute,
albeit in "broad terms," thereby
acknowledging that the political branches
act on matters of exclusion and admittance
through statutes and treaties.
Where the Executive claims need of a power
not yet delegated in order to control entry
into the country, the Supreme Court has
instructed it to look to Congress for a
remedy. Other statutory justification may
also exist in some cases. If these petitioners
present "special circumstances," as the
Executive appears to suggest, Congress
may, within constitutional limits, provide a
remedy.
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,
relied on by the majority (and the
Executive), is not to the contrary. That case
does not stand for the proposition that any
detention by the Executive is authorized if it
serves to effect exclusion of an alien whom
the Executive chooses not to admit. To the
contrary, the Supreme Court looked to a
statute then in effect and since repealed,
wherein Congress had "expressly
authorized" the President to exclude aliens
without a hearing when the Attorney
General determined entry would be
prejudicial to the interests of the United
States. The Attorney General so determined
and ordered the petitioner excluded on the
basis of confidential information. Thus, in
Mezei the Supreme Court recognized broad
Executive power not because it was inherent
to the Office of the President, but because in
Mezei's case that power was specifically
authorized by Congress. Mezei is thus
another case in which the Supreme Court
found detention justified because it was
authorized by statute.
B.
The majority does not adopt outright the
Executive's argument that detention here is
justified under an extra-statutory Executive
power, but instead seems to conclude that
the habeas court lacks the power to order the
release of non-"enemy combatant"
Guantanamo detainees from indefinite
detention, even where such detention is not
justified by statute. The effect, however, is
much the same. To reach this conclusion,
the majority has recast the traditional inquiry
of a habeas court from whether the
Executive has shown that the detention of
the petitioners is lawful to whether the
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petitioners can show that the habeas court is
"expressly authorized" to order aliens
brought into the United States. Along the
way, the majority's analysis tends to
conflate the power of the Executive to
classify an alien as "admitted" within the
meaning of the immigration statutes, and the
power of the habeas court to allow an alien
physically into the country. But this
analysis, like the majority's rights/remedy
discussion, ignores the very purpose of the
Great Writ and its province as a check on
arbitrary Executive power. The power to
grant the writ means the power to order
release.
Furthermore. the majority has
mischaracterized relevant precedent. The
majority offers that the district court did not
have the power to order that petitioners be
released into the United States because such
an order would impermissibly "set aside the
decision of the Executive Branch" to deny
petitioners release into the United States.
But the Supreme Court in Clark makes clear
that a district court has exactly the power
that the majority today finds lacking-the
power to order an unadmitted alien released
into the United States when detention would
otherwise be indefinite. The majority notes
that Clark, like Zadvydas, rested on the
proposition that detention was unauthorized
by the immigration statutes. But that only
goes to whether detention is justified.
Relevant here is that once the Supreme
Court concluded the detention was unlawful,
it ordered the aliens released into the United
States. If the majority were correct that a
habeas court, upon finding that the
Executive detains indefinitely an unadmitted
alien without authorization, is nonetheless
powerless to order release, then the
Executive in Clark could have continued the
detention, even without legal justification.
Instead, the Supreme Court held that "the
petitions for habeas corpus should have been
granted."
The majority also offers that because
petitioners are aliens outside the United
States and have not applied for visas they
are not entitled to the same due process as
the aliens in Zadvydas and even Clark.
However, in Boumediene, the Supreme
Court rejected this territorial rationale as to
Guantanamo, holding that detainees who
were brought there involuntarily were
entitled under the Constitution to seek
habeas relief because "[i]n every practical
sense Guantanamo is not abroad; it is within
the constant jurisdiction [and 'plenary
control'] of the United States." It held
further that whether a substitute process
"satisf[ied] due process standards" was not
"the end [of the Court's] inquiry," because
"[h]abeas corpus is a collateral process that
exists, in Justice Holmes' words, to 'cu[t]
through all forms and g[o] to the very tissue
of the structure."' Furthermore, the majority
does not explain how a lack of procedural
due process rights in petitioners, which it
asserts and uses to distinguish Clark, would
go to the power of the court, which the
majority finds lacking.
In sum, the majority aims to safeguard the
separation of powers by ensuring that the
judiciary does not encroach upon the
province of the political branches. But just
as the courts are limited to enumerated
powers, so too is the Executive, and the
habeas court exercises a core function under
Article III of the Constitution when it orders
the release of those held without lawful
justification. Indeed habeas is not an
encroachment, but "a time-tested device"
that "maintain[s] the 'delicate balance of
governance' that is itself the surest
safeguard of liberty." The petitioners have
the privilege of the writ including the right
to invoke the court's power to order release,
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and the Supreme Court's decision in Clark
shows that a habeas court has the power to
order the release into the United States of
unadmitted aliens whom the Executive
would prefer to detain indetinitely but as to
whom the Executive has exercised no lawful
detention authority. The petitioners seeking
release into the United States are seventeen
Uighurs who come to the court as
unadmitted aliens who are not "enemy
combatants" or otherwise shown by the
Executive, when afforded the opportunity, to
be dangerous or a threat to U.S. interests,
and as to whom the Executive as yet has
failed to show grounds for their detention,
which appears indefinite. Because the
district court prematurely determined the
petitioners were entitled to be released into
the country prior to ascertaining whether the
Executive, as asserted, would have lawful
grounds to detain them under the
immigration statutes, I concur with the
judgment and would remand the case so that
the district court could so ascertain. Unlike
the majority, however, I would conclude,
consistent with the province of the Great
Writ and the power of the political branches,
that, were the district court to ascertain
thereafter that petitioners' detention is not
lawful and has become effectively
indefinite, then under (lark, it would have
the power to order them conditionally
released into the country.
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"Detainees' Case Put off"
SCOTUSblog
June 29, 2009
Lyle Denniston
Lawyers for 13 Guantanamo Bay prisoners
learned Monday that the Supreme Court has
put off any action on their case until its next
Term. After noticing that the Court had
issued no order on the case of Kiyemba, et
al., v. Obama, et al. (08-1234), the attorneys
checked with Court aides and were told
there would be no decision "until October at
the earliest." That apparently means that the
Court will not consider granting or denying
the case until it next assembles for a private
Conference on Sept. 29.
Because the Court took no formal action on
Kiyemba Monday, there was no explanation.
It is possible to speculate on the reasons.
Among them could be that the Court did not
want to be seen to be interfering with
diplomatic efforts to arrange the re-
settlement of the 13 men in the case-
Chinese Muslims who are members of the
Uighur sect. The U.S. Solicitor General had
told the Court that four of 17 Uighurs
originally involved in the case had been
released, and that diplomatic efforts would
go on to try to place the other 13.
Another possible reason was that the Court
was unwilling, while the new Obama
Administration was sorting out its overall
detention policy, to engage in a
confrontation over presidential or
congressional war powers of the kind that
had led to four earlier rulings limiting
detention authority. The prospect that the
remaining 13 might yet be placed in another
country perhaps made it seem that the case
simply would become moot in a matter of
weeks.
Still another factor in the postponement
decision could have been Congress' passage
this month of new legislation that severely
restricts the President's power to order the
release of any detainees at Guantanamo, to
live in the U.S. or to be re-settled in any
other country. That legislation raises
significant new constitutional questions, and
the Court may have been reluctant to take
them on if, in fact, they would not have to
do so because the case might become moot.
Because the case had developed so late in
the just-closed Term, the Court would not
have heard it until the next Term even if it
had opted to grant review now, unless the
Court held a special summer session, which
was unlikely. That, too, may have
contributed to the perception that there was
no need to act on it Monday.
For the 13 men involved, of course, the
postponement means that, even though they
are no longer considered to be dangerous or
enemies, they will continue to be confined at
Guantanamo Bay under conditions that their
lawyers contend are little better than those
faced by prisoners still regarded as enemies.
They will gain relief from their captivity
over the summer months only if the State
Department succeeds in efforts-stalled for
years-to re-settle all of them.
In the meantime, the D.C. Circuit Court's
ruling in the Kiyemba case-a declaration
that no federal judge has any authority to
order the release of Guantanamo detainees,
at least when the prisoners seek to be
transferred to the U.S.-will remain
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unreviewed and thus fully intact. Although it
applies formally only to an order to transfer
the Uighurs to the U.S. to live, federal
District judges in other habeas cases have
interpreted the Circuit Court decision to
mean that they cannot order the actual
release of any Guantanamo detainee, but can
only urge the government to take diplomatic
steps to release those who are eligible.
Thus, the combined effects of the Kiyemba
decision by the Circuit Court and the new
legislative limits imposed by Congress may
seriously complicate President Obama's
efforts to fashion new\ detention policy and
to take control over the fate of the 229
detainees remaining at Guantanamo.
In their petition to the Supreme Court, the
Uighurs had contended that, absent review
of the Circuit Court ruling, the detainees'
fate would depend upon the "largesse" of
the Executive Branch. But it also now
depends, at least in the near future, on how
far Congress's new restrictions go to curb
how the President may use what authority
remains available to his branch of
government.
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"Court Blocks Release of 17 Uighurs into U.S."
The Washington Post
February 19, 2009
Del Quentin Wilber and Carrie Johnson
A federal appeals court yesterday blocked
the transfer to the United States of a small
band of Chinese Muslims held at the U.S.
military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
The decision by a three-judge panel reversed
a lower-court ruling that ordered the
government to release the 17 Uighurs and
resettle them with Uighur families in the
Washington region. The government no
longer considers the Uighurs to be enemy
combatants and has been trying to find
nations willing to take them in. U.S.
authorities do not want to send the men
home to China, where they are considered
terrorists and may be tortured.
The ruling came the day top government
lawyers, including White House Counsel
Gregory B. Craig, visited Guantanamo Bay
as part of their efforts to determine what to
do with the remaining 245 detainees.
Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. is
visiting the facility Monday. He is in charge
of a government task force that will
determine who can be released, sent to other
countries or charged with crimes. President
Obama has said he wants to close the prison
within a year.
The appeals court decision yesterday came
in a lawsuit brought by the Uighurs, who are
challenging their detention in federal court.
The panel on the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit ruled that U.S. District
Judge Ricardo M. Urbina had erred in
ordering the Uighurs' release into the United
States.
Two of the judges, Karen LeCraft
Henderson and A. Raymond Randolph,
found that Urbina had overstepped his
authority in ordering such a remedy. Only
the executive branch and Congress have the
power to allow people to enter the United
States, they said.
"The question here is not whether petitioners
should be released, but where," Randolph
wrote, adding that the Supreme Court has
long "sustained the exclusive power of the
political branches to decide which aliens
may, and which aliens may not, enter the
United States, and on what terms."
In a concurring opinion, Judge Judith W.
Rogers wrote that federal judges had the
right to order the release of the Uighurs into
the country but that Urbina first needed to
assess whether the men should be excluded
from entry under immigration laws.
Government lawyers have said that because
the men trained at a military camp in
Afghanistan they would probably be
prevented from entering the United States
under immigration laws.
The judges sent the case back to Urbina for
reconsideration.
One other federal judge has ordered
detainees to be released from Guantanamo.
U.S. District Judge Richard J. Leon recently
ordered the government to engage in
diplomatic efforts to transfer six detainees to
other countries after he determined that there
was not enough evidence to justify their
418
confinement. The government
transferred three of those prisoners.
has
Human rights advocates and attorneys for
detainees said yesterday's ruling will
weaken the efforts of other detainees
seeking freedom. Absent the power to order
the release of detainees into the United
States, the Supreme Court's decision in June
granting them the right to challenge their
confinements before independent judges "is
now meaningless," said Susan Baker
Manning, an attorney for the Uighurs. "You
win and still can't get out," she said.
The Uighurs are natives of northwestern
China who have been demanding an
independent homeland. The 17 Uighurs
were picked up in Pakistan in early 2002 and
accused of training at military camps in
Afghanistan sponsored by the East Turkistan
Islamic Movement, a group that the Bush
administration designated a terrorist
organization after the men were captured.
They have repeatedly told military officials
they are not enemies of the United States.
The Justice Department did not produce any
evidence to justify their confinement.
Government lawvers argued that the
president had the power to detain the men
until they could be safely transferred to
another country.
In ordering their release into the United
States, Urbina said in October that
diplomatic resettlement efforts had stalled
and that the Constitution "prohibits
indefinite detention without cause."
P. Sabin Willett, an attorney for the Uighurs,
said he and other lawyers have been
pressing the Obama administration to let the
Uighurs into the country.
An administration official declined to
comment on the decision, saying only that
Obama "has requested a review of all of
these cases, and we're not going to prejudge
the outcome of the review and comment on
individual cases."
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"Judge Orders Guantanamo Releases"
Los Angeles Times
October 8, 2008
David G. Savage
For the first time, a federal judge has
ordered the Bush administration to release
prisoners held at the U.S. military facility at
Guantanamo Bay. Cuba, ruling Tuesday that
17 Chinese Muslims must be brought to his
courtroom by the end of the week so that
they can be set free.
U.S. District Judge Ricardo M. Urbina said
that the government's authority to hold the
men had "ceased" and that they were
entitled to be released.
He said he would hold a hearing to decide
on the conditions for releasing the men.
Several religious and social groups,
including 20 church leaders from
Tallahassee, Fla., said they would help the
men resettle in their community.
The 17 are Uighurs who fled persecution in
the far western reaches of China. U.S.
authorities, fearing what Chinese officials
would do, have refused to send them back to
China, and no other country has been willing
to take them.
The judge's order came more than six years
after the men were sent to Guantanamo and
more than four years after the Pentagon
cleared most of them to be released. The
Supreme Court ruled four months ago that
judges can order the release of prisoners
wrongly held at Guantanamo.
Soon thereafter, a federal appeals court
reviewed the case of one of the Uighurs,
Huzaifa Parhat, and ruled that the
government had no basis for believing he
was an "enemy combatant." That decision
set the stage for Urbina's ruling Tuesday.
Civil liberties advocates hailed the order.
"This is a historic day for the United States,"
said Emi MacLean, a lawyer for the Center
for Constitutional Rights. "Finally, we are
beginning the process of taking
responsibility for our mistakes and fixing
them."
But Bush administration lawyers have
insisted that judges have no authority to
interfere with the handling of foreign
military prisoners. On Tuesday, they also
argued that immigration laws prohibit the
release into the United States of individuals
alleged to have terrorist ties and asked for an
emergency order to block the release.
Administration officials "are deeply
concerned by and strongly disagreed with"
the decision to release the men, White
House Press Secretary Dana Perino said in a
statement.
Human rights lawyers have described the 17
Uighurs as among the most egregious
examples of wrongful imprisonment at
Guantanamo. Natives of an area they call
East Turkistan, the Uighurs fled from
oppression by the Chinese government,
including its policy of forced abortions, and
settled in Afghanistan in 2001.
But after U.S. bombing raids hit their camps,
they fled to Pakistan, where they were taken
into custody by locals, who turned them
420
over to U.S. troops offering $5,000 bounties
for suspected foreign fighters. The U.S.
military alleged that the Uighurs had
received military training, and they were
suspected of ties to the East Turkistan
Islamic Movement, which the State
Department had designated a terrorist group.
But the Uighurs strongly denied any ties to
the Taliban, Al Qaeda or other enemies of
the United States; their only enemy, they
said, was the government of China.
They said they had initially welcomed being
in U.S. custody. hoping they would be safe
and treated humanely.
Instead, 22 Uighurs were imprisoned at
Guantanamo Bay in 2002. Five were
released and sent to Albania two years ago,
but the rest remained in custody because no
country was willing to accept them. Lawyers
spent years in court arguing for their release.
"The U.S. government has long recognized
these men did not pose, and really never
posed, a threat to the United States," said
Jennifer Daskal, a lawyer for Iluman Rights
Watch. Tuesday's ruling was significant, she
said, because a judge "rejected the Bush
administration's theory that its own
determination can trump judicial rev iew and
constitutional rights."
Neil McGaraghan, a Boston lawyer who
worked on the Uighurs' case, said the men
would be released from military custody
Friday, barring a last-minute order from the
appellate court.
Since 2002, the Pentagon has approved the
release of more than 500 prisoners from
Guantanamo, including the five Uighurs sent
to Albania. More than 250 are still being
held, including about 60 who would be freed
if the U.S. government could find countries
willing to take them.
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"For 20 at Guantanamo, Court Victories Fall Short"
The Neiw York Timnes
February 26, 2009
William Glaberson
Since the Supreme Court's landmark ruling
in June giving Guantanamo detainees a
constitutional right to have federal judges
review their imprisonment, 23 of the men
have been declared in court not to be
enemies of the United States.
But 20 of those 23 remain at the United
States naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
caught in a strange limbo of exonerated men
living behind barbed wire. Their lawyers are
now appealing directly to President Obama,
arguing that the federal habeas corpus cases
allowed by the Supreme Court decision are
failing to deliver the only justice that
matters: freedom.
"These are innocent men, held in a prison
that has become a national shame," the
lawyers say in a letter to President Obama
they are to release at a Washington news
conference on Thursday. They ask that the
president "restore liberty to these men" by
sending them home, finding another country
where they are willing to go, or permitting
them into the United States.
Although most of the men are held in
conditions less restrictive than
Guantanamo's maximum-security cells, they
remain prisoners subject to military rules
and, some of the lawyers claim, abusive
conditions. One of them is Lakhdar
Boumediene, an Algerian who once lived in
Bosnia, for whom the Supreme Court's June
ruling was named.
Stephen H. Oleskey, one of his lawyers, said
Mr. Boumediene and another Algerian who
was also ordered freed by a judge in
November see their legal victory as hollow.
"It's very hard to explain how they could be
free men and still be imprisoned," Mr.
Oleskey said.
A Justice Department spokesman, Dean
Boyd, said officials were "taking all
necessary and appropriate steps" to transfer
the two Algerians and were "actively
seeking the resettlement" of 17 others,
Muslim Uighurs from China. He said the
government was considering whether to
appeal a judge's January ruling in the case
of the 20th detainee, a former resident of
Saudi Arabia who was first detained when
he was 14.
Some legal experts say the cases of the 20
men pose an extraordinary challenge for the
courts, which are generally able to ensure
that prisoners who should not be held can be
released. But government officials say
arranging the transfers of Guantanamo
detainees to other countries involves a
complicated negotiation through a minefield
of international sensitivities.
The Bush administration refused to admit
any of the former Guantanamo detainees
into the United States. The Obama
administration has not yet made its position
clear.
Samuel Issacharoff, a professor at New
York University Law School, said the
standoff showed the limitations of the legal
system in dealing with the prison set up
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seven years ago on the naval base in Cuba,
partly to be remain clear of American courts.
"The Bush administration chose the path of
holding people beyond the reach of the law,"
Professor Issacharoff said. "The Obama
administration is learning it is difficult to
unmind those practices." Habeas corpus
cases, he said, are hampered because there
are no clear rules about how to deal with
prisoners who cannot simply be set free
outside the jailhouse doors.
The detainees' lawyers assert that at least
two of the 20 men have been physically
abused in recent weeks. A spokeswoman for
the prison, Cmdr. Pauline Storum, said there
had been no substantiated claims of abuse in
recent weeks.
In a news conference in Washington,
Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. said that
in a visit to Guantanamo on Monday he
noted a "very conscious attempt" by guards
to "conduct themselves in an appropriate
way."
The 17 Uighurs have been described as
terrorists by the Chinese government, which
has a history of repressive measures in
dealing with its Muslim minority. Last
week, a federal appeals court overturned a
district judge's order that would have freed
the men in the United States, saying the
judge was assuming powers reserved to the
President and Congress. But that decision
left in place the Bush administration's
concession that the men are not enemy
combatants, the classification the
government used to detain men at
Guantanamo.
Bush administration officials said for years
that they could not return the Uighurs to
China for fear of mistreatment or torture.
They also said efforts to find a new home
for the 17 men had failed after talks with
more than 100 countries.
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"Analysis: What Are Detainees' Rights Now?"
SCOTUSblog
June 12, 2008
Lyle Denniston
The Supreme Court's lead opinion in the
Guantanamo Bay cases Thursday declares
simply: "The detainees in these cases are
entitled to a prompt habeas corpus hearing.
. . . The costs of delay can no longer be
borne by those who are held in custody."
But that does not mean any detainee is going
to be released soon-although that ultimate
remedy does have to remain available as a
potential outcome. Much was decided on
Thursday-particularly in terms of
constitutional magnitude-but much
remains open for the future. What is next,
and where might the decision lead in the
end? Answers, but only preliminary
answers, can be suggested.
First, however, some policy and political
calculations have to be gauged. The decision
does leave President Bush and Congress
with the power to try again (assuming they
could find some common ground) to head
off habeas. Even though Thursday's
decision was a constitutional ruling, the
Court did not say that there can never be any
substitutes for habeas review of detention.
But, as a matter of political reality, a
Republican President with only six months
left in office and historically low popular
approval ratings, and a Democratic Congress
that is less and less deferential to the
Executive even on war-on-terrorism issues,
very likely will not be able to agree in the
short time realistically available to find an
alternative to habeas that has any chance of
surviving a court test.
The Pentagon, too, still has some options
open to it. It can scrap the existing system
that decides who is to be designated as an
"enemy combatant" and thus must remain
confined. The Court did not strike down the
so-called Combatant Status Review
Tribunals; indeed, it said, they "remain
intact." But, the less such a filtering system
protects a detainee's legal rights, the more
chances he has to challenge the enemy label
and the detention in court, according to
Thursday's decision. Does the Pentagon
have a military interest in expanding
detainee's rights up-front? Given its history
with CSRTs, the answer is probably not.
The Pentagon perhaps also might ponder
some changes in the system for trying
detainees on war crimes charges-the so-
called military commissions that are
ponderously moving forward at
Guantanamo. But the Court said nothing
about the commission system Thursday, so
the military may have no incentive to re-
think a system that it has struggled to keep
going amid a host of difficulties, major and
minor. Still, the Court's ruling does portend
some serious challenges to the military
commissions through habeas cases, even
though the specific cases decided Thursday
involved challenges only to detention, not to
prosecution.
There is one other political calculation to
take into account: the prospect that
Guatanamo Bay itself may be shut down
entirely as an apparatus for detention and
prosecution of captives in the war on
terrorism. That could change, in wholesale
ways, the fate of the detainees, and Bush
Administration policy. But, between now
and the start of a new Presidency, the time
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may be too short to find an alternative to
Guantanamo, at least one that the President
and Congress could agree on.
Thus, leaving aside all the prospects for
political change of greater or lesser moment,
what is going to happen next for the
detainees is going to be legal in nature. As
the Court said, the captives must have a
"prompt" habeas hearing. What will go on in
those hearings is going to be discussed
shortly by the judges of the U.S. District
Court in Washington (where such hearings
will be held) joined by lawyers for the
detainees, and for the government (Justice
Department and Pentagon, in particular). As
an earlier post on this blog indicated, the
judges are already planning for such
discussions.
Those in on the discussions about habeas
proceedings have some leeway in how to
proceed, because the Court said explicitly on
Thursday that its "opinion does not address
the content of the law that governs" the
Guantanamo detention. "That is a matter yet
to be determined."
But there is a good deal of guidance in the
Court's opinion written by Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy, although some of it is a bit
contradictory, or perhaps at least a bit
unclear. On the one hand, for example, the
Court says the detainees must have a
"prompt" habeas hearing. But elsewhere, the
opinion says that "federal courts should
refrain from entertaining an enemy
combatant's habeas corpus petition at least
until after the [Defense] Department, acting
via the CSRT, has had a chance to review
his status." The latter point, however, does
not explicitly take account of the fact that all
of the detainees now at Guantanamo (270 or
so remain) have had at least one CSRT
review, and a few have had more than one.
The Pentagon, though, may want to have
some additional "do-overs," especially if it
fears that the existing basis for a specific
prisoner's detention is vulnerable to a strong
habeas challenge, so the Court may be
anticipating some time for those to occur.
And it obviously did have in mind future
captives, not yet at Guantanamo.
It is clear from the opinion that the detainees
who already have had their CSRT reviews
may proceed directly to District Court, with
a new or reopened habeas challenge. (Some
200 habeas petitions are already waiting
there.) The Court said that the detainees in
that category need not pursue their
challenges to CSRT decisions in the D.C.
Circuit Court under the Detainee Treatment
Act (Congress' alternative to habeas). To
require those who have been held for six
years to complete that process ahead of
habeas "would be to require additional
months, if not years, of delay," the Court
said.
In fact, in the two cases that the Court
explicitly decided Thursday (Boumediene v.
Bush, 06-1195, and Al Odah i. U.S., 06-
1196), the Court ordered the D.C. Circuit to
send them back to District Courts for the
habeas review now required.
Still, the Court said it was not disturbing the
DTA process that Congress assigned to the
D.C. Circuit, so it will be up to that tribunal,
in cases other than those in which detainees
have been held for years, to decide how to
proceed, if at all, now. Lawyers in some of
the DTA cases pending at the Circuit Court
are already under orders to advise that Court
on what they think should happen following
the Supreme Court decision. One of the
cases in which such an updating order has
been issued involves Salim Ahmed Hamdan,
who has seeking to use his DTA not only to
challenge his detention, but his war crimes
prosecution before a military commission.
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The Circuit Court already has under
advisement an appeal testing the legal rights
of another Guantanamo detainee, Omar
Ahmed Khadr.
But, returning to the habeas cases that are
expected to resume in District Court, what
rights will the captives have? Or, at least,
what did Thursday's decision seem to say
about those rights, even while insisting it
was not providing a final checklist of rights?
Two somewhat general principles were
stated: (1) that, if the detention decision
comes in a proceeding in which the
captive's legal rights are limited so that the
process was not "thorough," the habeas
review must be more expansive and
comprehensive; and (2) that the judges
handling habeas cases "must have adequate
authority to make a determination in light of
the relevant law and facts and to formulate
and issue appropriate orders for relief,
including, if necessary, an order directing
the prisoner's release."
Going beyond those generalities, the Court
made comments, in critiquing the CSRT and
DTA proceedings, that suggest what habeas
rights a detainee probably has to have before
a court can uphold a decision that he must
remain in detention or before a court would
allow him to be tried for war crimes (since a
CSRT or other designation of enemy status
is necessary for a war crimes trial):
1. The habeas hearing must be prompt-at
least for a detainee who has been held for
several years (the time factor is uncertain).
2. The habeas review must be sufficiently
comprehensive to significantly reduce the
risk of error in an enemy designation, and
the court must have the authority to correct
errors in that designation.
3. The detainee must have a meaningful
right to rebut the Pentagon's evidence that
seeks to support an enemy label, including
some right to bring in additional evidence
challenging the enemy status finding.
4. The detainee must have the assistance of a
lawyer.
5. The detainee's habeas case may demand
an answer to the question of whether the
President has the authority to order a captive
held indefinitely-in other words, to
challenge the basic authority of the
Executive to have a prolonged detention
policy for war-on-terrorism captives.
6. Release of custody, at least a
"conditional" release (unspecified
conditions), must remain one of the remedy
options. It would not be enough,
constitutionally, for a court merely to order a
new CSRT proceeding as the only possible
remedy.
Potentially, the first five of these rights may
exist in a habeas case brought by a detainee
who is facing a war crimes prosecution
before a military commission. That is
because a habeas challenge in that context
would be, in part, a challenge to the enemy
designation that must be made before a
detainee may be charged with war crimes.
But a habeas challenge in the war crimes
context might also involve other
constitutional claims of defects in the
military prosecution itself-such as a denial
of access to classified evidence against the
accused. It is unclear, though, whether a
habeas court would have the authority to
examine those challenges in a pre-trial
habeas case-or would have to await a final
conviction. There might be other ways,
different from habeas, for challenging the
constitutionality of the commission process.
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The Court said nothing Thursday about such
challenges. Those, too, are for the future.
There is no wav. at this point, to predict how
many-if any-detainees now at
Guantanamo may win their freedom as a
result of the ruling. District Court judges
already have been divided in their views of
detainees' rights, and that conflict is likely
to continue.
An entirely separate question arises over
whether the decision will provide habeas
access for any detainees held elsewhere than
at Guantanamo Bay-for example, at the
U.S. military's detention facility at Bagram
air base in Afghanistan. Detainees there now
have attempts at habeas pending in the
District Courts in Washington.
Their attorneys surel) will attempt to take
advantage of the ruling, and of the separate
decision Thursday (in Munaf v. Geren, 06-
1666), finding that habeas rights do apply to
those held by the U.S. military in Iraq. The
Munaf decision involved only American
citizens so held, but lawyers predictably
would contend that should apply to foreign
nationals so held, too-on the same
rationale that the Guantanamo decision
recognized habeas rights for foreign
nationals at the Cuba base.
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"Analysis: Congress Moves to Control Detainees"
SCOTUSblog
June 21, 2009
Lyle Denniston
On the eve of the Supreme Court's planned
look at the most significant sequel to its
year-ago ruling in Boumediene v. Bush,
Congress has moved to take control of the
fate of Guantanamo Bay detainees in ways
that could cut back sharply on the power of
the courts, and also could limit the
President's powers.
On Thursday, the Justices are scheduled to
examine in their private Conference the case
of Kiyemba, et al., v. Obama, et al. (08-
1234), according to the Court's electronic
docket. Lawyers for 13 Chinese Muslim
(Uighur) detainees at Guantanamo are
seeking to test the scope of the Court's
constitutional mandate in Boumediene that
the detainees at the U.S. military prison in
Cuba have a right to challenge their
captivity, including a possible right to be
released.
Soon, however, President Obama is
expected to sign into law a new war budget
bill sent to him by Congress last Thursday.
Congress flatly barred the release of any
Guantanamo prisoner into the U.S.-the
issue that is the core of the Kiyemba case-
and surrounded with conditions the
President's power to transfer any detainee
anywhere in the world.
In those provisions, Congress, apparently
deeply upset at the prospect not only of
release of detainees into the U.S., but their
release to live in any other country, moved
to take a significant degree of control over
transfers, further detention, and even, to a
degree, criminal prosecution of any
Guantanamo captive.
While the new limits on transfers or release
of detainees are written in terms of denial of
federal funds (under Congress's Article I
Spending Clause powers), their actual
practical effect is to restrict in major ways
the President's use of his powers under
Article II. The bill makes no attempt to curb
directly the Article III authority of the
courts, but they clearly would have a direct
impact.
Some of the provisions would appear to
have such an impact on the Kiyemba case,
whether or not the Court agrees to review
the D.C. Circuit Court decision that is being
tested in the Uighurs' petition. (When the
petition was filed, 17 Uighurs were
involved; 13 remain at Guantanamo and in
the case, since four have just been
transferred to live in Bermuda-a move that
might at least have been complicated, and
might not have occurred at all, if the new
congressional limits had been in place.)
It seems likely that the Obama
Administration will notify the Court,
perhaps before Thursday, about the new
legislation, perhaps to reinforce its earlier
argument that the Court should deny review
of the Kiyemba case. Solicitor General
Elena Kagan promptly told the Court of the
four Uighurs' move to Bermuda.
The Kiyemba case, as it now stands,
represents what could be the final chance
that some Guantanamo detainees could gain
their release and move to the U.S. to live, at
least temporarily. Any such move is barred
by the D.C. Circuit ruling that is being
challenged; the Circuit Court ruled, in a
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decision binding on all federal District
judges handling Guantanamo cases, that no
court has authority to order detainees sent to
the U.S. even if the individual was no longer
considered an enemy. If that ruling stands,
any transfers to the U.S. would be up to
Congress and the President, and Congress
has now imposed a flat ban.
The 17 Uighurs won a District Court judge's
permission last October to release into the
U.S., but that was struck down by the
Circuit Court. The remaining 13 Uighurs are
asking the Justices to reverse that
conclusion.
District Courts are processing more than 150
remaining Guantanamo cases. And they are
doing so partly under the Constitution and
partly under the traditional federal habeas
law that dates back to 1789. The Court ruled
in Boumediene that Congress had invalidly
suspended habeas, and so restored the right
to challenge continued detention at
Guantanamo.
District judges have been moving forward
with the cases, resolving a host of new legal
issues that arose after Boumediene. In any
case that now results in a judge's ruling that
continued detention of an individual was not
legally justified, the issue would arise-
under the new provisions Congress has
adopted-whether the judge had any
authority to do anything about such a
finding.
If the Supreme Court were to agree to hear
and decide the Kiyemba case, it potentially
could reinforce judges' authority to order
release, at least somewhere, or it could ratify
the Circuit Court ruling denying that
authority. If it denies review, then the
political branches would seem to have
nearly unlimited authority.
Here are the key provisions of the
"supplemental appropriation" bill (H.R.
2346) bearing upon the fate of detainees. (It
is now at the White House awaiting the
President's expected signature):
** The measure bars the use of any funds to
release an individual now at Guantanamo
into the continental U.S., the District of
Columbia, Alaska or Hawaii.
** It bars the use of any funds to transfer
any Guantanamo prisoner to the U.S. for
prosecution for a crime, or for detention
"during legal proceedings," until 45 days
after the President submits a required secret
report to Congress.
** The report is to lay out a plan for what to
do with each detainee, with findings of any
assessment of risk to the U.S. if the
individual is transferred to the U.S. for trial
or during legal proceedings, the costs of
such a transfer, the legal rationale including
any court order for transfer, and a plan to
"mitigate any risk" found.
** The President must also send to Congress
in that report a copy of a notice to the
governor of any state to which the prisoner
will be transferred (or to the mayor of
Washington, D.C.), with advance
assurances-14 days before transfer-from
the Attorney General that the individual
"poses little or no security risk to the United
States."
** It bars the use of any funds, in this bill or
any prior legislation, to transfer or release an
individual now at Guantanamo to any other
country outside the U.S., unless the
President sends a secret report to Congress
15 days before transfer.
** In that secret report, the President must
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provide the identity of the individual to be
transferred elsewhere and where he is to be
sent, an assessment of any risk to national
security, including a risk to U.S. armed
forces, posed by the transfer or release of the
individual, along with actions taken to
"mitigate such risk," plus any terms of an
agreement with another country for such a
transfer, including whether any money was
paid in the arrangement.
** The President may not shut down the
Guantanamo military prison until after he
has sent a secret report to Congress
"describing the disposition or legal status of
each individual" now at Guantanamo.
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"Detainees Challenge New Law"
SCOTUSblog
June 25, 2009
Lyle Denniston
Hours after President Obama signed into law
a new set of restrictions on release of
Guantanamo Bay detainees, lawyers for a
group of prisoners told the Supreme Court
Thursday that the law appears to violate the
Constitution. That raises the stakes on the
case of Kiyemba, et al., v. Obama, et al.
(08-1234)-a petition that the Court was
scheduled to consider at today's private
Conference.
Lawyers for the 13 prisoners involved-
members of a Chinese Muslim sect known
as Uighurs-said that the Court should go
ahead and grant review of their case, and
consider as part of that review "the impact
of the new law." But, they added, the statute
"appears to be an unlawful suspension"-
that is, a violation of the Constitution's strict
limit on suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus. A year ago, in Boumediene v. Bush,
the Court struck down earlier legislation
limiting detainees' legal rights, finding that
to be an unlawful suspension of the writ.
While U.S. Solicitor General Elena Kagan
advised the Court Thursday morning of the
new legislation, she did not make any
comments on it. Earlier, she had urged the
Court not to hear the case, leaving the
development of detainee policy to the White
House and Congress. The new law is a
supplemental appropriations measure that
covers many subjects other than the detainee
provisions, such as funding current military
war operations. The detainee clauses are in
Section 14103, found on pages 62 and 63 of
the bill text. The measure also imposes new
duties on the President to send reports to
Congress on what is being done with each of
the 229 detainees remaining at Guantanamo.
That provision is Sec. 319, found on pages
16 and 17 of the bill text.
The detainees' counsel said that, "in another
case," the Court might want to send the
lawsuit back to lower courts to examine the
effect of the new legislation. But, they went
on, the D.C. Circuit Court has ruled for the
government already, so such a remand might
not illuminate the issues in the case.
Passage of the new law, their letter added, is
an argument for Supreme Court review, not
against it. "At the heart of this case is the
question whether habeas corpus represents a
real check on the political branches. The
new legislation sharpens that question."
District judges have been applying the
Circuit Court ruling, the letter noted, and as
a result may only request, not order, the
release of any Guantanamo prisoner.
In earlier opposing review of the Kiyemba
petition, the Solicitor General supported the
Circuit Court ruling, and said that
diplomatic efforts to resettle the Uighurs
were continuing. (Four of the 17 previously
involved in the case before the Justices have
now been released, and are living in
Bermuda. The other 13 remain at
Guantanamo, and their lawyer, in a letter to
the Court a week ago, said that "no solution
has been found" for those 13.)
All of the new filings are being considered
by the Justices as they consider whether to
hear the case, according to entries on the
Court's electronic docket.
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National Rifle Association v. City of Chicago
08-1497
Ruling Below: Nat ' Rifle Ass 'n v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009)
Under United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876), Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886),
and Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894), which rejected arguments based on the 14th
Amendment's privileges and immunities clause and have never been overruled, the Second
Amendment, which protects individuals' right to keep and bear arms in home for self-defense,
applies only to federal government and its enclaves, and thus does not invalidate laws of Chicago
and Oak Park, Ill., that ban possession of most handguns.
Question Presented: Is the right of people to keep and bear arms, guaranteed by the Second
Amendment, incorporated into the due process clause or the privileges and immunities clause of
the 14th Amendment so as to be applicable to the states, thereby invalidating ordinances
prohibiting possession of handguns in home?
NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V.
CITY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, and Village of Oak Park, Illinois, Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Decided June 2, 2009
[Excerpt: some citations omitted]
EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge.
Two municipalities in Illinois ban the
possession of most handguns. After the
Supreme Court held in District of Columbia
v. Heller, that the second amendment
entitles people to keep handguns at home for
self-protection, several suits were filed
against Chicago and Oak Park. All were
dismissed on the ground that Heller dealt
with a law enacted under the authority of the
national government, while Chicago and
Oak Park are subordinate bodies of a state.
The Supreme Court has rebuffed requests to
apply the second amendment to the states.
The district judge thought that only the
Supreme Court may change course.
Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller rejected
arguments that depended on the privileges
and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Slaughter-House Cases,
holds that the privileges and immunities
clause does not apply the Bill of Rights, en
bloc, to the states. Plaintiffs respond in two
ways: first they contend that Slaughter-
House Cases was wrongly decided; second,
recognizing that we must apply that decision
even if we think it mistaken, plaintiffs
contend that we may use the Court's
" selective incorporation" approach to the
second amendment. Cruikshank, Presser,
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and Miller did not consider that possibility,
which had yet to be devised when those
decisions were rendered. Plaintiffs ask us to
follow Nordyke v. King, which concluded
that Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller may be
bypassed as fossils. (Nordyke applied the
second amendment to the states but held that
local governments may exclude weapons
from public buildings and parks.) Another
court of appeals has concluded that
Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller still control
even though their reasoning is obsolete.
Maloney v. Cuomo, 554 F.3d 56 (2d
Cir.2009). We agree with Maloney, which
followed our own decision in Quilici v.
Morton Grove.
Repeatedly, in decisions that no one thinks
fossilized, the Justices have directed trial
and appellate judges to implement the
Supreme Court's holdings even if the
reasoning in later opinions has undermined
their rationale. "If a precedent of this Court
has direct application in a case, yet appears
to rest on reasons rejected in some other line
of decisions, the Court of Appeals should
follow the case which directly controls,
leaving to this Court the prerogative of
overruling its own decisions." Cruikshank,
Presser, and Miller have "direct application
in [this] case". Plaintiffs say that a decision
of the Supreme Court has "direct
application" only if the opinion expressly
considers the line of argument that has been
offered to support a different approach. Yet
few opinions address the ground that later
opinions deem sufficient to reach a different
result. If a court of appeals could disregard a
decision of the Supreme Court by
identifying, and accepting, one or another
contention not expressly addressed by the
Justices, the Court's decisions could be
circumvented with ease. They would bind
only judges too dim-witted to come up with
a novel argument.
Anyone who doubts that Cruikshank,
Presser. and Miller have "direct application
in [this] case" need only read footnote 23 in
Heller. It says that Presser and Miller
.reaffirmed [ Cruikshank 's holding] that the
Second Amendment applies only to the
Federal Government." The Court did not say
that Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller
rejected a particular argument for applying
the second amendment to the states. It said
that they hold "that the Second Amendment
applies only to the Federal Government."
The Court added that "Cruikshank's
continuing validity on incorporation" is "a
question not presented by this case". That
does not license the inferior courts to go
their own ways; it just notes that Cruikshank
is open to reexamination by the Justices
themselves when the time comes. If a court
of appeals may strike off on its own, this not
only undermines the uniformity of national
law but also may compel the Justices to
grant certiorari before they think the
question ripe for decision.
State Oil Co. v. Khan, illustrates the proper
relation between the Supreme Court and a
court of appeals. After Albrecht v. Herald
Co., held that antitrust laws condemn all
vertical maximum price fixing, other
decisions (such as Continental T V, Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc.) demolished Albrecht's
intellectual underpinning. Meanwhile new
economic analysis showed that requiring
dealers to charge no more than a prescribed
maximum price could benefit consumers, a
possibility that Albrecht had not considered.
Thus by the time Khan arrived on appeal,
Albrecht's rationale had been repudiated by
the Justices, and new arguments that the
Albrecht opinion did not mention strongly
supported an outcome other than the one
that Albrecht announced. Nonetheless, we
concluded that only the Justices could inter
Albrecht. By plaintiffs' lights, we should
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have treated Albrecht as defunct and reached
what we deemed a better decision. Instead
we pointed out Albrechi s shortcomings
while enforcing its holding. The Justices,
who overruled Albrecht in a unanimous
opinion, said that we had done exactly the
right thing, "for it is this Court's prerogative
alone to overrule one of its precedents."
What's more, the proper outcome of this
case is not as straightforward as the outcome
of Khan. Although the rationale of
Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller is defunct,
the Court has not telegraphed any plan to
overrule Slaughter-House and apply all of
the amendments to the states through the
privileges and immunities clause, despite
scholarly arguments that it should do this.
The prevailing approach is one of "selective
incorporation." Thus far neither the third nor
the seventh amendment has been applied to
the states-nor has the grand jury clause of
the fifth amendment or the excessive bail
clause of the eighth. How the second
amendment will fare under the Court's
selective (and subjective) approach to
incorporation is hard to predict.
Nordyke asked whether the right to keep and
bear arms is "deeply rooted in this nation's
history and tradition." It gave an affirmative
answer. Suppose the same question were
asked about civil jury trials. That institution
also has deep roots, yet the Supreme Court
has not held that the states are bound by the
seventh amendment. Meanwhile the Court's
holding that double-jeopardy doctrine is not
"so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental," "selective incorporation" thus
cannot be reduced to a formula.
Plaintiffs' reliance on William Blackstone
for the proposition that the right to keep and
bear arms is "deeply rooted" not only slights
the fact that Blackstone was discussing the
law of another nation but also overlooks the
reality that Blackstone discussed arms-
bearing as a political rather than a
constitutional right. The United Kingdom
does not have a constitution that prevents
Parliament and the Queen from matching
laws to current social and economic
circumstances, as the people and their
representatives understand them. It is
dangerous to rely on Blackstone (or for that
matter modem European laws banning
handguns) to show the meaning of a
constitutional amendment that this nation
adopted in 1868. Blackstone also thought
determinate criminal sentences (e.g., 25
years, neither more nor less, for robbing a
post office) a vital guarantee of liberty.
That's not a plausible description of
American constitutional law.
One function of the second amendment is to
prevent the national government from
interfering with state militias. It does this by
creating individual rights, Heller holds, but
those rights may take a different shape when
asserted against a state than against the
national government. Suppose Wisconsin
were to decide that private ownership of
long guns, but not handguns, would best
serve the public interest in an effective
militia; it is not clear that such a decision
would be antithetical to a decision made in
1868. (The fourteenth amendment was
ratified in 1868, making that rather than
1793 the important year for determining
what rules must be applied to the states.)
Suppose a state were to decide that people
cornered in their homes must surrender
rather than fight back-in other words, that
burglars should be deterred by the criminal
law rather than self help. That decision
would imply that no one is entitled to keep a
handgun at home for self-defense, because
self-defense would itself be a crime, and
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Heller concluded that the second
amendment protects only the interests of
law-abiding citizens.
Our hypothetical is not as farfetched as it
sounds. Self defense is a common-law gloss
on criminal statutes, a defense that many
states have modified by requiring people to
retreat when possible, and to use non-lethal
force when retreat is not possible. An
obligation to avoid lethal force in self-
defense might imply an obligation to use
pepper spray rather than handguns. A
modification of the self-defense defense
may or may not be in the best interest of
public safety-whether guns deter or
facilitate crime is an empirical question-
but it is difficult to argue that legislative
evaluation of which weapons are appropriate
for use in self-defense has been out of the
people's hands since 1868. The way to
evaluate the relation between guns and
crime is in scholarly journals and the
political process, rather than invocation of
ambiguous texts that long precede the
contemporary debate.
Chicago and Oak Park are poorly placed to
make these arguments. After all, Illinois has
not abolished self-defense and has not
expressed a preference for long guns over
handguns. But the municipalities can, and
do, stress another of the themes in the debate
over incorporation of the Bill of Rights:
That the Constitution establishes a federal
republic where local differences are to be
cherished as elements of liberty rather than
extirpated in order to produce a single,
nationally applicable rule. Federalism is an
older and more deeply rooted tradition than
is a right to carry any particular kind of
weapon. How arguments of this kind will
affect proposals to "incorporate" the second
amendment are for the Justices rather than a
court of appeals.
AFFIRMED
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"NRA Takes Gun Case to High Court; 2nd Amendment's Breadth Disputed"
USA Today
June 8, 2009
Joan Biskupic
WASHINGTON-One year after the
Supreme Court ruled that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to
keep handguns, the justices have before
them a new test of that right.
The National Rifle Association has appealed
a ruling from a U.S. appeals court in
Chicago that said the right to bear arms
cannot be invoked by gun owners
challenging state and local firearm
regulations. It said the high court's
groundbreaking decision last term in a case
from Washington, D.C., allows the Second
Amendment to cover only regulations by the
federal government-at least until the high
court weighs in again.
If the justices decide to take up the appeal, it
would probably be heard next fall by a
bench that could include Supreme Court
nominee Sonia Sotomayor, who is now on a
federal appeals court in New York. She was
part of a court panel in January that similarly
held that the 2008 gun decision did not
apply to state regulations.
A U.S. appeals court in San Francisco,
however, ruled this year that the Second
Amendment indeed covers state gun
restrictions.
"Because of the split in opinions (on the
breadth of the 2008 ruling), it seems likely
that the court would take it," says Daniel
Vice, a lawyer with the Brady Center to
Prevent Gun Violence. He says a ruling
could affect gun laws nationwide.
The June 2008 decision, decided by a 5-4
vote, said for the first time that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to
keep handguns at home for self-protection.
A 1939 high court decision had led lower
courts and many legal analysts to believe the
Second Amendment covered firearm rights
only for state militias such as National
Guard units.
The new decision in National Rifle
Association v. Chicago by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 7th Circuit in Chicago,
written by conservative Ronald Reagan
appointee Frank Easterbrook, echoes the
closely scrutinized decision from a three-
judge panel of the U.S. appeals court for the
2nd Circuit that included Sotomayor.
She joined an opinion that rejected a
challenge to a New York ban on certain
weapons used in martial arts and
emphasized that the high court has never
specifically ruled that the Second
Amendment can be applied to state
regulations. That 2nd Circuit decision,
Maloney v. Cuomo, provoked some gun
rights groups to protest Sotomayor's
nomination.
The Virginia-based Gun Owners of America
called her "an anti-gun radical."
Last Tuesday's decision by the 7th Circuit
undercuts criticism that the Sotomayor panel
decision was extreme. As Easterbrook
wrote, specifically agreeing with the 2nd
Circuit, the Supreme Court said in the 2008
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case involving a District of Columbia
handgun ban that it was not deciding
whether the Second Amendment covered
state or local regulations.
Justice Antonin Scalia, who authored the
high court decision, noted that the case arose
from the federal enclave of Washington,
D.C., and that past cases said the Second
Amendment covers only the federal
government. With a new case from a state or
municipality, the court could extend the
reach of the Second Amendment.
Until then, Easterbrook wrote in the case
involving handgun bans in Chicago and Oak
Park, an appeals court may not -strike off on
its own." He said that would undermine the
uniformity of the nation's laws.
The NRA's Stephen Halbrook, representing
Chicago and Oak Park residents who want
to keep handguns at home, urged the justices
to take up the 7th Circuit case to resolve the
reach of last term's ruling. Halbrook said the
right to guns "allows one to protect life
itself."
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"Court Upholds Chicago's Gun Laws"
Los Angeles Times
June 3, 2009
David G. Savage
The U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals on
Tuesday upheld strict gun control
ordinances in Chicago and suburban Oak
Park, Ill., setting the stage for a Supreme
Court battle over whether the 2nd
Amendment and its protection for gun
owners extends to state and municipal laws.
In a 3-0 decision, the judges said they were
bound by legal precedents that held the 2nd
Amendment applied only to federal laws.
Judge Sonia Sotomayor, President Obama's
nominee to the Supreme Court, in January
joined a three-judge panel in New York that
came to the same conclusion. Last week,
activists cited that decision in calling her an
"anti-gun radical."
Tuesday's decision in the Chicago case was
written by Judge Frank H. Easterbrook and
joined by Judges Richard A. Posner and
William J. Bauer. All three were Republican
appointees.
One of the lawyers for the Chicago gun
owners said he planned to appeal the case to
the Supreme Court.
Last year, the high court in a 5-4 decision
said the 2nd Amendment "right to keep and
bear arms" protects an individual's right to
have a gun for self-defense. Before, many
judges had said the amendment protected
only a state's right to maintain a militia.
Though the case gained wide attention, the
ruling struck down a handgun ban only in
the District of Columbia, a federal enclave.
The justices did not decide whether the 2 nd
Amendment applied the same way
throughout the country.
Until the middle of the 20th century, most
parts of the Bill of Rights applied only to the
federal government, not to states or
localities. In a step-by-step process,
however, the high court decided that most of
the rights in the Bill of Rights were
fundamental to liberty and, therefore, limit
the action of states and municipalities.
There are exceptions. For example, the 5th
Amendment says persons can be charged
with a serious crime only by "indictment of
a grand jury," but this right was not
extended to the states.
Gun-rights advocates have been focused on
the issue since last year's high court ruling.
"We believe it is time for this issue to be
decided," said Alan Gura, a Virginia lawyer
who won the D.C. gun case last year. He
said he would file a petition in the Supreme
Court seeking a review of the Chicago
ruling.
Gura represented four gun owners who are
challenging the near ban on private
handguns in Chicago. In April, the U.S. 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco
came to the opposite conclusion on the 2nd
Amendment. Its judges said that because the
right to bear arms is a fundamental right, it
should apply to local and state ordinances.
Easterbrook questioned whether lower
courts should make such a leap.
"Federalism is an older and more deeply
rooted tradition than is the right to carry any
particular kind of weapon," he wrote.
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Deciding what is a fundamental right is "for
the justices rather than a court of appeals,"
he said.
The high court will not consider an appeal in
the Chicago case until the fall. By then,
Sotomayor may well be one of the justices
considering the issue.
"This ruling is significant because it means
that we can continue to enforce our gun
ordinance while this case progresses," said
Jennifer Hoyle, spokeswoman for Chicago's
Law Department, said in a written statement.
"We recognize, though, that this fight is not
over, and we are prepared to go to the
Supreme Court if the court agrees to take the
case," she added, noting that in the
Washington, D.C., case, the Supreme Court
determined that "reasonable" gun
restrictions would pass constitutional
muster.
In December. Chicago Mayor Richard M.
Daley said he was looking at less-sweeping
gun control measures in the wake of the
D.C. ruling. Daley specifically referred to
new laws in the nation's capital requiring
gun owners to go through five hours of
safety training, register their firearms every
three years and undergo criminal
background checks every six years. Hoyle
could not immediately verify the status of
those efforts.
Richard Pearson, executive director of the
Illinois State Rifle Assn., said he predicted
last year that the case would go to the
Supreme Court.
"It was not unexpected," Pearson said. "The
only surprise to this was it happened so
quickly." Oral arguments were held before
the 7th Circuit on May 26, he said.
Typically, decisions come months after
arguments are heard.
"They did say this case was better decided
by the Supreme Court than the 7th Circuit,"
Pearson added, noting that the Supreme
Court in previous Bill of Rights cases has
extended federal interpretations to states and
cities-a step called "incorporation" in legal
language.
Most of the other rights are incorporated,
"so I see no reason why this won't be
incorporated," he said.
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"The Best Nine-Page Opinion Ever Written!"
Balkinization
June 12, 2009
Sandy Levinson
Anyone interested in seeing how a very
smart judge can write the equivalent of a
treatise in nine pages should read Frank
Easterbrook's opinion in National Rifle
Association of America v. City of Chicago.
It is a truly remarkable performance.
The ostensible (and actual) issue before the
Court (a pane of Easterbrook, Posner, and
Bauer) is whether Heller should be read as
incorporating the Second Amendment
against states (or, in this case, the City of
Chicago). One Circuit, the Second, has held
no, in an opinion joined by Judge
Sotomayor. Another, the Ninth, did hold that
the Second Amendment was incorporated.
So what did the Seventh Circuit do?
First, it is worth noting that the case was
argued on May 26 and decided on June 2.
This is quite astounding in itself, suggesting
very powerfully, as is argued in the opinion
itself, that the panel found near-frivolous the
claim that it was empowered to apply the
Amendment against the states. The reason
is, as the opinion elaborates at length, the
insistence by the United States Supreme
Court that it and only it is empowered to
overrule past precedents clearly on point,
whatever the current strength of those
precedents. Thus the Circuit notes that three
opinions (the most recent in 1886) clearly
and unequivocally hold that the Amendment
limits only the national government. As if
this isn't enough, they quote footnote 23 of
Heller. which acknowledges the
reaffirmation in the latter two of these cases
the holding in Cruickshank "that the Second
Amendment applies only to the Federal
Government."
So why doesn't it follow the trail blazed by
the Ninth Circuit panel, which argued that
these earlier cases rejected only one
particular argument and not the claim
accepted by that Circuit? "if a court of
appeals could disregard a decision of the
Supreme Court," Easterbrook writes, "by
identifying, and accepting, one or another
contention not expressly addressed by the
Justices, the Court's decisions could be
circumvented with ease. They would bind
only judges too dim-witted to come up with
a novel argument." As it happens, I don't
find the Supreme Court's authoritarianism
with regard to its unique ability to inter what
are clearly anachronistic precedents at all
attractive, but if one takes the doctrine
seriously, as the Seventh Circuit either does
or professes to do, then it seems to me that
their argument is clearly correct. Thus they
endorse the Second Circuit decision and,
along the way, make it far harder for
political conservatives-unless they want to
describe Easterbrook and Posner as
apostates-to denounce Sotomayor for
following extraordinarily clear doctrine on
the point.
(Incidentally, I think there is some reason to
believe that the panel may in fact believe
that the doctrine makes sense. Thus it writes
that "If a court of appeals may strike off on
its own [as the Ninth Circuit did], this not
only undermines the uniformity of national
law but also may compel the Justices to
grant certiorari before they think the
question ripe for decision." What is
interesting is what they mean by "ripe for
decision." We know that Richard Posner
basically disdains the notion that one can
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treat the Supreme Court as a "court of law."
So does "ripeness," in this context, simply
mean, perhaps with a tip of the hat to Alex
Bickel, that we leave it up to the political
judgment of the Supreme Court \hen it is
timely for its own intervention with regard
to a political hot potato? Quite frankly. I'd
far rather that Judge Sotomayor be examined
on this question than on more substantive
doctrine (do you like Roe? Do you support
Heller?) where she will obviously make sure
that she has nothing truly interesting to say.
The Supreme Court's control over its own
docket is really quite astonishing, in many
ways, including enhancing the ability to
decide on rawly political grounds whether or
not to take any given case in the first place.
I'd be very curious to know what Judge
Sotomayor, as the most experienced federal
judge to be nominated for the Supreme
Court I believe in our history, if one adds
together her district and circuit judging,
thinks of the way that the Court has
exercised this low-visibility, completely
discretionary authority with providing
whatever "guidance" we think the Court
should in fact provide to the constitutionally
"inferior" courts.)
Where things get even more interesting,
though, is Easterbrook's well-founded
statement of doubt as to whether the
Supreme Court is in fact prepared to
overturn the earlier non-Incorporation cases.
As he notes, the Court has firmly rejected
Hugo Black's "every last word" theory of
incorporation in favor of "selective
incorporation." But on what basis does the
Court (or any court) "select"? At that point
Easterbrook noted that the Ninth Circuit,
quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, asked if
"the right to keep and bear arms is 'deeply
rooted in this nation's history and tradtion."'
At the very least, this requires judges to pick
and choose among aspects of the Bill of
Rights on the basis of highly debatable,
often tendentious, claims about our "history
and tradition." As Easterbrook writes,
'"Selective incorporation' ... cannot be
reduced to a formula."
So, should the Court actually grant cert in
either the Seventh or Second Circuit case-
it is almost literally inconceivable that they
would do so in the Ninth Circuit case, since
that Circuit, after "incorporating" the
Amendment, promptly went on to say that it
didn't prevent Alameda County from
refusing to rent public property for gun
shows-we would have the enjoyable
spectacle of watching Scalia and Thomas try
to figure out what is sufficiently rooted to be
incorporated. It occurred to me while
reading the opinion that both of these
Justices joined the Court well after the
heyday of incorporation, selective or
otherwise. Indeed, Edwin Meese was
making speeches during the 1980s attacking
the idea of incorporation, and one might
assume that either or both of these Justices
were sympathetic to Meese's attack.
Judge Easterbrook notes that one might
think that the right to trial by jury is part of
the American tradition, yet it is notoriously
true that neither the grand jury provision of
the Fifth Amendment nor the petit jury
provision of the Seventh Amendment has
been incorporated against the states. There
may be very good reason for this, but the
reasons ultimately sound, dare one say it, in
a "policy choice" rather than any plausible
citation to the barebones text or original
history of the sacred document. Indeed, the
opinion notes that "the best way to evaluate
the relation between guns and crime is in
scholarly journals and the political process,
rather than invocation of ambiguous texts
that long precede the contemporary debate."
Take that, Nino (a former colleague of both
Easterbrook's and Posner at the University
of Chicago Lawx School)! Is there any doubt
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that the panel is basically endorsing Fourth
Circuit Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson's
lacerating attack on Heller as betraying
.judicial restraint" and instead serving as a
"conservative" analogue of Roe'? (Of course,
Judge Posner, no inferior polemicist himself,
delivered his own withering attack in the
pages of the New Republic.)
But wait, there's more. The opinion
concludes by quoting Brandeis's hoary
chestnut about states as laboratories of
experiment, thus throwing the "federalism"
gauntlet before, say, Anthony Kennedy, who
often writes of the "dignity" of states and the
necessity of federal courts to protect that
dignity against those who would unduly
limit state autonomy. Thus the penultimate
line of this remarkable opinion: "Federalism
is an older and more deeply rooted tradition
than is a right to carry any particular kind of
weapon."
Moreover, Judge Easterbrook and his
colleagues note that any incorporation of
Heller, assuming one takes Scalia's opinion
truly seriously, means that every rejected
self-defense claim suddenly becomes a
constitutional issue, since the basis of
Scalia's opinion is the hitherto unrecognized
fundamental constitutional right of self
defense. Some states have limited that right,
for example, by requiring "retreat when
possible" or "to use non-lethal force when
retreat is not possible." Are such limitations
now unconstitutional? If not, why not, if one
both takes Scalia's opinion seriously and
believes that it applies against the states'?
Chief Justice Roberts dissented this past
week in Caperton, the "judge-buying" case,
on the ground that it will open the floodgates
to litigation by every frustrated loser in any
given case. Maybe that's true, maybe not.
But if one is concerned about such
floodgates, then incorporation of the Second
Amendment would seem to assure at least as
many new constitutionally based cases as
Caperton. So perhaps Roberts will be less
eager to incorporate than some of his
conservative admirers think. Who knows?
The Court's moderates-1 am hesitant to
call them "liberals"-might ordinarily be
expected to endorse incorporating the Bill of
Rights, but does anyone seriously believe
they will do so in this case? Won't they
happily embrace "selective incorporation"
and suggest that the Second Amendment has
little to do with the "ordered liberty"
endorsed by Justice Cardozo in Palko v.
Conn., which (in)famously refused to
incorporate the double-jeopardy clause
against the states.
In any event, anyone who enjoys good legal
prose by a judge operating at the top of his
game should read the Easterbrook opinion.
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"Judge: Chicago's Handgun Ban Legal"
Chicago Sun Times
December 19, 2008
Fran Spielman
A federal judge Thursday upheld Chicago's
1982 handgun ban as Mayor Daley disclosed
plans to strengthen it by following
Washington, D.C.'s lead.
In a 5-4 decision in June, the U.S. Supreme
Court overturned the D.C. handgun ban on
grounds that the Second Amendment
establishes the right to own a handgun for
personal self-defense.
Hours later, the National Rifle Association
and the Illinois State Rifle Association filed
lawsuits seeking to overturn handgun bans
in Chicago, Morton Grove, Evanston and
Oak Park. Wilmette and Morton Grove
subsequently repealed their handgun bans.
Chicago held fast.
On Thursday, U.S. District Judge Milton
Shadur rewarded the city for hanging tough,
rejecting the lawsuits challenging Chicago's
handgun ban.
The Daley administration was pleased, but
not surprised, by the decision.
"We believe this decision will ultimately
end up in the hands of the U.S. Supreme
Court," said Law Department spokeswoman
Jennifer Hoyle. "This is a victory for us, but
it's just one step in what is probably going
to be a long battle."
Todd Vandermyde, Illinois legislative
liaison for the NRA, called Thursday's
ruling a temporary victory for the city.
-It was expected. We went to court knowing
it's going to take a higher court's ruling," he
said. "City taxpayers are going to pay more
money in legal fees for a fight they will
ultimately lose."
Earlier this week, the D.C. Council replaced
its overturned law with new regulations that
require gun owners to receive five hours of
safety training and register their firearms
every three years. Gun owners would face
criminal background checks every six years.
At a news conference on school violence
that preceded Shadur's ruling, Daley hinted
strongly that he intends to follow
Washington's lead.
The mayor said he plans to hold a gun
conference early next year to consider trends
in gun violence and how they might be
addressed within the legal parameters
established by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Asked whether he intends to use the city's
home-rule powers to mimic the D.C.
changes, Daley said, "That's what we're
looking at."
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"Conflicting Rulings on Guns Open Way to Supreme Court Review"
The New York Times
June 17, 2009
John Schwartz
A year ago, the United States Supreme
Court issued a landmark decision
establishing the constitutional right of
Americans to own guns. But the justices did
not explain what the practical effect of that
ruling would be on city and state gun laws.
Could a city still ban handguns? The justices
said the District of Columbia could not, but
only because it is a special federal district.
The question of the constitutionality of
existing city and state gun laws was left
unanswered.
That left a large vacuum for the lower courts
to fill. Supporters of gun rights filed a flurry
of lawsuits to strike down local gun
restrictions, and now federal appeals courts
have begun weighing in on this divisive
issue, using very different reasoning. One
court this month upheld Chicago's ban on
automatic weapons and concealed handguns,
while in April a California court disagreed
on the constitutional issue.
The differing opinions mean that the whole
issue of city and state gun laws will
probably head back to the Supreme Court
for clarification, leading many legal experts
to predict a further expansion of gun rights.
The new cases are fallout from last year's
Supreme Court case, District of Columbia v.
Heller, which struck down parts of
Washington's gun-control ordinance, the
strictest in the country, and stated for the
first time that the Second Amendment gives
individuals a right to keep and bear arms for
personal use. But the court declined to say
whether the Second Amendment in general
applies to state and local governments.
In January, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in New
York, in a ruling joined by Judge Sonia
Sotomayor, declined to apply the Second
Amendment to a New York law that banned
the martial-arts device known as chukka
sticks. The ban was allowed to stay in place.
Then in April, a three-judge panel of the
Ninth Circuit, in San Francisco, ruled that
the Second Amendment did apply to the
states, even though it allowed a California
county to ban guns on government property
like state fairgrounds. That case, Nordyke v.
King, is being considered for a rehearing by
the full Ninth Circuit.
Those two conflicting cases set the stage for
two other cases that were heard as one in the
Seventh Circuit in Chicago, testing that
city's handgun ban. On June 2, a three-judge
panel of the court, led by Chief Judge Frank
H. Easterbrook, a well-known conservative,
ruled that there was no basis for the court to
apply the Second Amendment to the states.
Such a decision, Judge Easterbrook wrote,
should be made only by the Supreme Court,
not at the appellate level.
The right of states to make their own
decisions on such matters, Judge
Easterbrook wrote, "is an older and more
deeply rooted tradition than is a right to
carry any particular kind of weapon."
The lawyers for the plaintiffs, including the
National Rifle Association, have asked the
Supreme Court to take up the Chicago cases.
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A split among the federal appeals circuits,
especially on constitutional issues, invites
Supreme Court action, said Adam Winkler,
a law professor at the University of
California, Los Angeles.
"Californians, Hawaiians and Oregonians
have a Second Amendment right to bear
arms, but New Yorkers, Illinoisans, and
Wisconsinites don't," Professor Winkler
said. "The Supreme Court will want to
correct this sooner rather than later."
The process of applying amendments of the
Bill of Rights to the states, known as
incorporation, began after the Civil War but
had its heyday in the activist Supreme Court
of the Earl Warren era. Much of the Bill of
Rights, including the First Amendment's
freedom of speech and some rights of
criminal defendants, have been applied to
the states, but other elements have not,
including the Seventh Amendment right to a
civil jury trial and the Second Amendment.
Incorporation fell out of favor after the
1960s, but a new generation of largely
liberal scholars of law and history have
brought it back into the intellectual
mainstream, said Akhil Reed Amar, a law
professor at Yale University, who supports
the process.
"The precedents are now supportive of
incorporation of nearly every provision of
the Bill of Rights," Professor Amar said.
"Now what's odd is that the Second
Amendment doesn't apply to the states."
Sanford Levinson. a law professor at the
University of Texas, said he would be
surprised if the Supreme Court accepted
these gun cases, because some of the
conservative justices on the court had
scoffed at incorporation arguments in the
past and might not want to set a precedent.
Professor Amar, however, argued that the
justices would not only take up the case but
would also ultimately vote for incorporation
of the Second Amendment.
Even if the Second Amendment becomes the
controlling law of every state and town,
constitutional scholars say it is still unlikely
that gun laws would be overturned
wholesale.
The Supreme Court's Heller decision last
year, notes Nelson Lund, a law professor at
George Mason University, "clearly indicates
that governments will still have wide
latitude to regulate firearms."
Even the Ninth Circuit in California, while
applying the Second Amendment to the
states, still upheld the gun ordinance that
gave rise to the lawsuit.
Eugene Volokh, a law professor at the
University of California, Los Angeles, said
the view of the Ninth Circuit reflected what
polls have said was, by and large, the view
of the American people.
"There is a right to bear arms," Professor
Volokh said, "but it's not absolute."
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"Gun Ruling Was Called a Landmark, but That Remains to Be Seen"
The Neiv York Times
March 17, 2009
Adam Liptak
About nine months ago, the Supreme Court
breathed new life into the Second
Amendment, ruling for the first time that it
protects an individual right to own guns.
Since then, lower federal courts have
decided more than 80 cases interpreting the
decision, District of Columbia v. Heller, and
it is now possible to make a preliminary
assessment of its impact.
So far, Heller is firing blanks.
The courts have upheld federal laws banning
gun ownership by people convicted of
felonies and some misdemeanors, by illegal
immigrants and by drug addicts. They have
upheld laws banning machine guns and
sawed-off shotguns. They have upheld laws
making it illegal to carry guns near schools
or in post offices. And they have upheld
laws concerning concealed and unregistered
weapons.
"The Heller case is a landmark decision that
has not changed very much at all," said
Adam Winkler, a law professor at the
University of California, Los Angeles, who
keeps a running tally of decisions based on
the case. "To date, the federal courts have
not invalidated a single gun-control law on
the basis of the Second Amendment since
Heller."
Heller itself struck down parts of the District
of Columbia's gun-control law, the strictest
in the nation. The case was brought by law-
abiding people who wanted to keep guns in
their homes for self-defense. The cases that
have followed it tend to concern more-
focused laws and less-attractive gun owners.
Harvey C. Jackson IV, for instance, argued
that he had a constitutional right to carry a
gun while selling drugs in a dangerous
neighborhood in East St. Louis, Ill. The
federal appeals court in Chicago was
unimpressed.
"The Constitution does not give anyone the
right to be armed while committing a
felony," Chief Judge Frank H. Easterbrook
wrote last month in Mr. Jackson's case.
Professor Winkler summarized the impact of
Heller in an article to be published in The
U.C.L.A. Law Review in June. "So far," he
wrote, "the only real change from Heller is
that gun owners have to pay higher legal
fees to find out that they lose."
There is one arguable exception to this
trend. Two judges have struck down a part
of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act, named after the murdered son of
John Walsh, the host of the television show
"America's Most Wanted." The act says that
people accused of child pornography
offenses must be prohibited from possessing
guns while they await trial.
That provision may well have been
unconstitutional as a matter of due process
even before Heller, as it seems to impose a
punishment before conviction. But two
courts have struck down the provision based
partly on the fact that a fundamental
constitutional right is at stake.
"A year ago, I might well have taken for
granted the authority of Congress to require
that a person charged with a crime be
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prohibited from possessing a firearm,"
Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV of the
Federal District Court in Manhattan wrote in
December. Heller changed that, he said.
"The right to possess a firearm is
constitutionally protected," Judge Francis
wrote. "There is no basis for categorically
depriving persons who are merely accused
of certain crimes of the right to legal
possession of a firearm.'"
The cases discussed so far all concerned
federal laws, and there is no question that
the Second Amendment applies to the
federal government. The great open question
after Heller is whether the Second
Amendment also applies to the states or, in
the legal jargon, whether the amendment is
incorporated against them.
The Supreme Court has said that most but
not all of the protections of the Bill of
Rights are incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment, one of the post-Civil War
amendments.
The consensus among legal scholars is that
incorporation of the Second Amendment is
likely. True, the Supreme Court has said in
some past cases that the Second Amendment
applies only to the federal government. But
a footnote in Heller cast doubt on those
decisions. For now, lower courts probably
have to follow the older decisions until the
Supreme Court says otherwise.
There are cases in the pipeline, notably in
the federal appeals courts in Chicago and
San Francisco, that could give the court an
opportunity to answer the question in its
next term.
Even if the court applies the amendment to
the states, though, little may change. Most
state constitutions already protect an
individual right to bear arms, and federal
protection, depending on its form, could
well be merely duplicative.
But some liberal lawyers and law professors
sense an opportunity, and they have urged
courts to incorporate the Second
Amendment in a novel way, one that might
help liberal arguments for protecting rights
not specifically mentioned in the
Constitution. Abortion and gay rights come
to mind.
In a supporting brief filed in the Chicago
case, lawyers for the Constitutional
Accountability Center, a liberal group, urged
the court to bypass the usual way that
amendments are applied to the states,
through the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process clause. Using that clause to
guarantee fundamental rights has always
seemed a little curious, as "due process"
would seem to protect only fair procedures
and not substance.
Another possibility, and the one urged by
the center's brief, is the Fourteenth
Amendment's "privileges and immunities"
clause, which says that "no state shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States." The virtues of that clause are
it makes sense by its terms and there is some
evidence that its framers specifically wanted
it to apply to allow freed slaves to have guns
to defend themselves.
All of this is awfully technical, of course,
and it may have no practical consequences
at all.
"My own bet," said Sanford Levinson, a law
professor at the University of Texas, "is that
Heller will more likely than not turn out to
be of no significance to anyone but
constitutional theorists."
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